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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.13066 |
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| _version_ | 1866918386934480896 |
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| author | Gheorghiu, Alexander V. |
| author_facet | Gheorghiu, Alexander V. |
| contents | The material conditional has long been charged with paradox. Defined truth-functionally, it renders true any conditional whose antecedent is false or consequent true -- hence, seemingly absurd statements such as `If unicorns exist, then $2+2=4$'. This has been taken as proof that the connective cannot capture the meaning of ordinary if-then sentences, which appear to imply a causal or evidential link. I argue, by contrast, that the paradoxes arise from a confusion of what it expresses caused by cognitive biases. The material conditional properly belongs to the class of indicative, not subjunctive, conditionals -- those that register patterns of co-variation rather than counterfactual dependence. When understood as a formal device marking entailment under a background theory, it faithfully represents a mode of reasoning essential to science itself: correlation without causation. The faults ascribed to it, therefore, are not flaws in meaning or standard use, but as misapplication and misreading. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_13066 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | In Defence of the Material Conditional Gheorghiu, Alexander V. Logic The material conditional has long been charged with paradox. Defined truth-functionally, it renders true any conditional whose antecedent is false or consequent true -- hence, seemingly absurd statements such as `If unicorns exist, then $2+2=4$'. This has been taken as proof that the connective cannot capture the meaning of ordinary if-then sentences, which appear to imply a causal or evidential link. I argue, by contrast, that the paradoxes arise from a confusion of what it expresses caused by cognitive biases. The material conditional properly belongs to the class of indicative, not subjunctive, conditionals -- those that register patterns of co-variation rather than counterfactual dependence. When understood as a formal device marking entailment under a background theory, it faithfully represents a mode of reasoning essential to science itself: correlation without causation. The faults ascribed to it, therefore, are not flaws in meaning or standard use, but as misapplication and misreading. |
| title | In Defence of the Material Conditional |
| topic | Logic |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.13066 |