ClawWorm: Self-Propagating Attacks Across LLM Agent Ecosystems

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Zhang, Yihao, Wei, Zeming, Luan, Xiaokun, Wu, Chengcan, Zhang, Zhixin, Wu, Jiangrong, Wu, Haolin, Chen, Huanran, Sun, Jun, Sun, Meng
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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_version_ 1866910061144571904
author Zhang, Yihao
Wei, Zeming
Luan, Xiaokun
Wu, Chengcan
Zhang, Zhixin
Wu, Jiangrong
Wu, Haolin
Chen, Huanran
Sun, Jun
Sun, Meng
author_facet Zhang, Yihao
Wei, Zeming
Luan, Xiaokun
Wu, Chengcan
Zhang, Zhixin
Wu, Jiangrong
Wu, Haolin
Chen, Huanran
Sun, Jun
Sun, Meng
contents Autonomous LLM-based agents increasingly operate as long-running processes forming densely interconnected multi-agent ecosystems, whose security properties remain largely unexplored. In particular, OpenClaw, an open-source platform with over 40,000 active instances, has stood out recently with its persistent configurations, tool-execution privileges, and cross-platform messaging capabilities. In this work, we present ClawWorm, the first self-replicating worm attack against a production-scale agent framework, achieving a fully autonomous infection cycle initiated by a single message: the worm first hijacks the victim's core configuration to establish persistent presence across session restarts, then executes an arbitrary payload upon each reboot, and finally propagates itself to every newly encountered peer without further attacker intervention. We evaluate the attack on a controlled testbed across four distinct LLM backends, three infection vectors, and three payload types (1,800 total trials). We demonstrate a 64.5\% aggregate attack success rate, sustained multi-hop propagation, and reveal stark divergences in model security postures -- highlighting that while execution-level filtering effectively mitigates dormant payloads, skill supply chains remain universally vulnerable. We analyse the architectural root causes underlying these vulnerabilities and propose defence strategies targeting each identified trust boundary. Code and samples will be released upon completion of responsible disclosure.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_15727
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle ClawWorm: Self-Propagating Attacks Across LLM Agent Ecosystems
Zhang, Yihao
Wei, Zeming
Luan, Xiaokun
Wu, Chengcan
Zhang, Zhixin
Wu, Jiangrong
Wu, Haolin
Chen, Huanran
Sun, Jun
Sun, Meng
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
Software Engineering
Autonomous LLM-based agents increasingly operate as long-running processes forming densely interconnected multi-agent ecosystems, whose security properties remain largely unexplored. In particular, OpenClaw, an open-source platform with over 40,000 active instances, has stood out recently with its persistent configurations, tool-execution privileges, and cross-platform messaging capabilities. In this work, we present ClawWorm, the first self-replicating worm attack against a production-scale agent framework, achieving a fully autonomous infection cycle initiated by a single message: the worm first hijacks the victim's core configuration to establish persistent presence across session restarts, then executes an arbitrary payload upon each reboot, and finally propagates itself to every newly encountered peer without further attacker intervention. We evaluate the attack on a controlled testbed across four distinct LLM backends, three infection vectors, and three payload types (1,800 total trials). We demonstrate a 64.5\% aggregate attack success rate, sustained multi-hop propagation, and reveal stark divergences in model security postures -- highlighting that while execution-level filtering effectively mitigates dormant payloads, skill supply chains remain universally vulnerable. We analyse the architectural root causes underlying these vulnerabilities and propose defence strategies targeting each identified trust boundary. Code and samples will be released upon completion of responsible disclosure.
title ClawWorm: Self-Propagating Attacks Across LLM Agent Ecosystems
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
Software Engineering
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.15727