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Main Authors: Liu, Deng, Chen, Song
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.16382
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author Liu, Deng
Chen, Song
author_facet Liu, Deng
Chen, Song
contents Hardware faults, specifically bit-flips in quantized weights, pose a severe reliability threat to Large Language Models (LLMs), often triggering catastrophic model collapses. We demonstrate that this vulnerability fundamentally stems from the spatial alignment between sensitive weight bits and extreme activation outliers, which causes a single hardware fault to be massively amplified. To address this, we propose Rotated Robustness (RoR), a training-free defense utilizing orthogonal Householder transformations. By applying an orthogonal rotation to the activation space, RoR geometrically smooths extreme outliers across all feature dimensions. This mechanism effectively breaks the alignment between outliers and vulnerable weights, mathematically guaranteeing original model accuracy. Extensive empirical evaluations across Llama-2/3, OPT, and Qwen families demonstrate the superior reliability of our approach. Under random bit-flip attacks, RoR reduces the stochastic collapse rate from 3.15\% to 0.00\% on Qwen2.5-7B. Furthermore, under severe targeted attacks with 50 Progressive Bit Search flips, RoR sustains robust reasoning on Llama-2-7B, maintaining a 43.9\% MMLU accuracy that nearly matches its 45.2\% unattacked accuracy, while competing defenses collapse to random guessing. Most notably, against the Single-Point Fault Attack (SPFA) -- the most aggressive targeted threat -- RoR exponentially inflates the attack complexity from a few bits to over 17,000 precise bit-flips. With a negligible storage overhead of 0.31\% and a minimal inference latency increase of 9.1\% on Llama-2-7B, RoR achieves true lossless robustness, providing a practical and highly reliable defense for LLM deployment.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_16382
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Rotated Robustness: A Training-Free Defense against Bit-Flip Attacks on Large Language Models
Liu, Deng
Chen, Song
Cryptography and Security
Hardware faults, specifically bit-flips in quantized weights, pose a severe reliability threat to Large Language Models (LLMs), often triggering catastrophic model collapses. We demonstrate that this vulnerability fundamentally stems from the spatial alignment between sensitive weight bits and extreme activation outliers, which causes a single hardware fault to be massively amplified. To address this, we propose Rotated Robustness (RoR), a training-free defense utilizing orthogonal Householder transformations. By applying an orthogonal rotation to the activation space, RoR geometrically smooths extreme outliers across all feature dimensions. This mechanism effectively breaks the alignment between outliers and vulnerable weights, mathematically guaranteeing original model accuracy. Extensive empirical evaluations across Llama-2/3, OPT, and Qwen families demonstrate the superior reliability of our approach. Under random bit-flip attacks, RoR reduces the stochastic collapse rate from 3.15\% to 0.00\% on Qwen2.5-7B. Furthermore, under severe targeted attacks with 50 Progressive Bit Search flips, RoR sustains robust reasoning on Llama-2-7B, maintaining a 43.9\% MMLU accuracy that nearly matches its 45.2\% unattacked accuracy, while competing defenses collapse to random guessing. Most notably, against the Single-Point Fault Attack (SPFA) -- the most aggressive targeted threat -- RoR exponentially inflates the attack complexity from a few bits to over 17,000 precise bit-flips. With a negligible storage overhead of 0.31\% and a minimal inference latency increase of 9.1\% on Llama-2-7B, RoR achieves true lossless robustness, providing a practical and highly reliable defense for LLM deployment.
title Rotated Robustness: A Training-Free Defense against Bit-Flip Attacks on Large Language Models
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.16382