Residual-based attack detection in cyber-physical systems: an optimal transport viewpoint

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Das, Souvik, Ganguly, Siddhartha
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Das, Souvik
Ganguly, Siddhartha
author_facet Das, Souvik
Ganguly, Siddhartha
contents This letter presents an optimal-transport (OT)-driven, distributionally robust attack detection algorithm, OT-DETECT, for cyber-physical systems (CPS) modeled as partially observed linear stochastic systems. The underlying detection problem is formulated as a minmax optimization problem using 1-Wasserstein ambiguity sets constructed from observer residuals under both the nominal (attack-free) and attacked regimes, and show that the minmax detection problem can be reduced to a finite-dimensional linear program for computing the worst-case distribution (WCD). Off-support residuals are handled via a kernel-smoothed score function that drives a CUSUM procedure for sequential detection. We also establish a non-asymptotic tail bound on the false-positive error of the CUSUM statistic under the nominal (attack-free) condition, under mild assumptions. Numerical illustrations are provided to evaluate the robustness properties of OT-DETECT.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_16588
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Residual-based attack detection in cyber-physical systems: an optimal transport viewpoint
Das, Souvik
Ganguly, Siddhartha
Optimization and Control
Systems and Control
Signal Processing
This letter presents an optimal-transport (OT)-driven, distributionally robust attack detection algorithm, OT-DETECT, for cyber-physical systems (CPS) modeled as partially observed linear stochastic systems. The underlying detection problem is formulated as a minmax optimization problem using 1-Wasserstein ambiguity sets constructed from observer residuals under both the nominal (attack-free) and attacked regimes, and show that the minmax detection problem can be reduced to a finite-dimensional linear program for computing the worst-case distribution (WCD). Off-support residuals are handled via a kernel-smoothed score function that drives a CUSUM procedure for sequential detection. We also establish a non-asymptotic tail bound on the false-positive error of the CUSUM statistic under the nominal (attack-free) condition, under mild assumptions. Numerical illustrations are provided to evaluate the robustness properties of OT-DETECT.
title Residual-based attack detection in cyber-physical systems: an optimal transport viewpoint
topic Optimization and Control
Systems and Control
Signal Processing
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.16588