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A mechanism design overview of Sedna

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Marsh, Benjamin, Ranchal-Pedrosa, Alejandro
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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