Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866911525922406400 |
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| author | De, Parikshit Panda, Abinash Pramanik, Anup |
| author_facet | De, Parikshit Panda, Abinash Pramanik, Anup |
| contents | We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or a "none of the above" stance within the decision process. We study this augmented single-peaked domain. On this domain, we characterize the class of rules called target rules with a default. We show that onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness characterize this class of rules. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_17772 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default De, Parikshit Panda, Abinash Pramanik, Anup Theoretical Economics We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or a "none of the above" stance within the decision process. We study this augmented single-peaked domain. On this domain, we characterize the class of rules called target rules with a default. We show that onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness characterize this class of rules. |
| title | Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.17772 |