Sharing The Secret: Distributed Privacy-Preserving Monitoring
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866915877674287104 |
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| author | Karimi, Mahyar Thejaswini, K. S. Bloem, Roderick Henzinger, Thomas A. |
| author_facet | Karimi, Mahyar Thejaswini, K. S. Bloem, Roderick Henzinger, Thomas A. |
| contents | In traditional runtime verification, a system is typically observed by a monolithic monitor. Enforcing privacy in such settings is computationally expensive, as it necessitates heavy cryptographic primitives. Therefore, privacy-preserving monitoring remains impractical for real-time applications. In this work, we address this scalability challenge by distributing the monitor across multiple parties -- at least one of which is honest. This architecture enables the use of efficient secret-sharing schemes instead of computationally intensive cryptography, dramatically reducing over-head while maintaining strong privacy guarantees. While existing secret-sharing approaches are typically limited to one-shot executions which do not maintain an internal state, we introduce a protocol tailored for continuous monitoring that supports repeated evaluations over an evolving internal state (kept secret from the system and the monitoring entities). We implement our approach using the MP-SPDZ framework. Our experiments demonstrate that, under these architectural assumptions, our protocol is significantly more scalable than existing alternatives. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_20107 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Sharing The Secret: Distributed Privacy-Preserving Monitoring Karimi, Mahyar Thejaswini, K. S. Bloem, Roderick Henzinger, Thomas A. Cryptography and Security Formal Languages and Automata Theory In traditional runtime verification, a system is typically observed by a monolithic monitor. Enforcing privacy in such settings is computationally expensive, as it necessitates heavy cryptographic primitives. Therefore, privacy-preserving monitoring remains impractical for real-time applications. In this work, we address this scalability challenge by distributing the monitor across multiple parties -- at least one of which is honest. This architecture enables the use of efficient secret-sharing schemes instead of computationally intensive cryptography, dramatically reducing over-head while maintaining strong privacy guarantees. While existing secret-sharing approaches are typically limited to one-shot executions which do not maintain an internal state, we introduce a protocol tailored for continuous monitoring that supports repeated evaluations over an evolving internal state (kept secret from the system and the monitoring entities). We implement our approach using the MP-SPDZ framework. Our experiments demonstrate that, under these architectural assumptions, our protocol is significantly more scalable than existing alternatives. |
| title | Sharing The Secret: Distributed Privacy-Preserving Monitoring |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Formal Languages and Automata Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.20107 |