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| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.20426 |
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| _version_ | 1866914514866274304 |
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| author | Médard, Muriel Chitra, Tarun Grundei, Moritz Zouarhi, Sajida |
| author_facet | Médard, Muriel Chitra, Tarun Grundei, Moritz Zouarhi, Sajida |
| contents | We study pricing mechanisms for low-latency payload delivery in settings where participant rewards depend on the time required to reconstruct a payload. In such environments, the decoding time distribution determines deadline-meeting probabilities and therefore bounds a participant's willingness to pay for additional delivery rate. Using a mean-field formulation, we derive price-rate bounds from simple stochastic arrival models and instantiate them for (i) unsharded transmission and (ii) sharded delivery under three regimes: uncoded sharding, fixed-rate erasure coding, and rateless coding. These bounds yield a comparative characterization of how symbol usefulness translates into economic value under deadline-driven utilities.
We further analyze a two-lane service consisting of a base lane and a Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) fast lane. In this turbo decoding setting, a receiver combines shards arriving via both lanes to minimize time to decode. Under a fixed base-lane price-rate pair and an aggregate rate constraint, we derive a fast-lane pricing bound and show how even modest additional RLNC rate can generate measurable utility gains, depending on the base-lane propagation regime. The framework extends naturally to stepwise reward schedules with multiple deadlines, and we illustrate its applicability on representative scenarios motivated by blockchain message dissemination and latency-sensitive competition. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_20426 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Pricing Innovation Under Latency Constraints: A Mean-Field Analysis of Coded Payload Delivery Médard, Muriel Chitra, Tarun Grundei, Moritz Zouarhi, Sajida Information Theory We study pricing mechanisms for low-latency payload delivery in settings where participant rewards depend on the time required to reconstruct a payload. In such environments, the decoding time distribution determines deadline-meeting probabilities and therefore bounds a participant's willingness to pay for additional delivery rate. Using a mean-field formulation, we derive price-rate bounds from simple stochastic arrival models and instantiate them for (i) unsharded transmission and (ii) sharded delivery under three regimes: uncoded sharding, fixed-rate erasure coding, and rateless coding. These bounds yield a comparative characterization of how symbol usefulness translates into economic value under deadline-driven utilities. We further analyze a two-lane service consisting of a base lane and a Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) fast lane. In this turbo decoding setting, a receiver combines shards arriving via both lanes to minimize time to decode. Under a fixed base-lane price-rate pair and an aggregate rate constraint, we derive a fast-lane pricing bound and show how even modest additional RLNC rate can generate measurable utility gains, depending on the base-lane propagation regime. The framework extends naturally to stepwise reward schedules with multiple deadlines, and we illustrate its applicability on representative scenarios motivated by blockchain message dissemination and latency-sensitive competition. |
| title | Pricing Innovation Under Latency Constraints: A Mean-Field Analysis of Coded Payload Delivery |
| topic | Information Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.20426 |