Strategy-proof Market Segmentation against Price Discrimination
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866916006186713088 |
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| author | Kuang, Zhonghong Li, Sanxi Liu, Yi Yu, Yang |
| author_facet | Kuang, Zhonghong Li, Sanxi Liu, Yi Yu, Yang |
| contents | Data regulations increasingly enable consumers to switch among market segments, making segmentation an endogenous outcome of strategic interaction. We study a model in which consumers choose segments before a monopolist sets segment-specific prices, and define a segmentation as strategy-proof when no consumer with positive measure can profitably deviate. Our main result provides a complete welfare characterization: in every strategy-proof segmentation, producer surplus is pinned at the uniform monopoly profit, consumer surplus ranges from the uniform monopoly level to the buyer-optimal level, and every consumer is weakly better off. We construct strategy-proof segmentations attaining every feasible outcome in this range. A finite-consumer model microfounds our solution concept, with equilibrium outcomes converging to our characterization as the population grows large. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_20609 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategy-proof Market Segmentation against Price Discrimination Kuang, Zhonghong Li, Sanxi Liu, Yi Yu, Yang Theoretical Economics Data regulations increasingly enable consumers to switch among market segments, making segmentation an endogenous outcome of strategic interaction. We study a model in which consumers choose segments before a monopolist sets segment-specific prices, and define a segmentation as strategy-proof when no consumer with positive measure can profitably deviate. Our main result provides a complete welfare characterization: in every strategy-proof segmentation, producer surplus is pinned at the uniform monopoly profit, consumer surplus ranges from the uniform monopoly level to the buyer-optimal level, and every consumer is weakly better off. We construct strategy-proof segmentations attaining every feasible outcome in this range. A finite-consumer model microfounds our solution concept, with equilibrium outcomes converging to our characterization as the population grows large. |
| title | Strategy-proof Market Segmentation against Price Discrimination |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.20609 |