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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.21691 |
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| _version_ | 1866910065236115456 |
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| author | Aminikalibar, Niloofar Farhadi, Farzaneh Chli, Maria |
| author_facet | Aminikalibar, Niloofar Farhadi, Farzaneh Chli, Maria |
| contents | Real-world infrastructure planning increasingly involves strategic interactions among autonomous agents competing over congestible, limited resources. Applications such as Electric Vehicle (EV) charging, emergency response, and intelligent transportation require coordinated resource placement and pricing decisions, while anticipating the adaptive behaviour of decentralised, self-interested agents. We propose a novel multi-agent framework for joint placement and pricing under such interactions, formalised as a bi-level optimisation model. The upper level represents a central planner, while the lower level captures agent responses via coupled non-atomic congestion games. Motivated by the EV charging domain, we study a setting where a central planner provisions chargers and road capacity under budget and profitability constraints. The agent population includes both EV drivers and non-charging drivers (NCDs), who respond to congestion, delays, and costs. To solve the resulting NP-hard problem, we introduce ABO-MPN, a double-layer approximation framework that decouples agent types, applies integer adjustment and rounding, and targets high-impact placement and pricing decisions. Experiments on benchmark networks show that our model reduces social cost by up to 40% compared to placement- or pricing-only baselines, and generalises to other MAS-relevant domains. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_21691 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Infrastructure Design via Multi-Agent Congestion Games with Joint Placement and Pricing Aminikalibar, Niloofar Farhadi, Farzaneh Chli, Maria Multiagent Systems Real-world infrastructure planning increasingly involves strategic interactions among autonomous agents competing over congestible, limited resources. Applications such as Electric Vehicle (EV) charging, emergency response, and intelligent transportation require coordinated resource placement and pricing decisions, while anticipating the adaptive behaviour of decentralised, self-interested agents. We propose a novel multi-agent framework for joint placement and pricing under such interactions, formalised as a bi-level optimisation model. The upper level represents a central planner, while the lower level captures agent responses via coupled non-atomic congestion games. Motivated by the EV charging domain, we study a setting where a central planner provisions chargers and road capacity under budget and profitability constraints. The agent population includes both EV drivers and non-charging drivers (NCDs), who respond to congestion, delays, and costs. To solve the resulting NP-hard problem, we introduce ABO-MPN, a double-layer approximation framework that decouples agent types, applies integer adjustment and rounding, and targets high-impact placement and pricing decisions. Experiments on benchmark networks show that our model reduces social cost by up to 40% compared to placement- or pricing-only baselines, and generalises to other MAS-relevant domains. |
| title | Strategic Infrastructure Design via Multi-Agent Congestion Games with Joint Placement and Pricing |
| topic | Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.21691 |