Publicly Understandable Electronic Voting: A Non-Cryptographic, End-to-End Verifiable Scheme
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866910065523425280 |
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| author | Gat, Alon |
| author_facet | Gat, Alon |
| contents | Modern democracies face an existential crisis of waning public trust in election results. While End-to-End Verifiable (E2E-V) voting systems promise mathematically secure elections, their reliance on complex cryptography creates a ``black box'' that forces blind trust in opaque software or external experts, ultimately failing to build genuine public confidence. To solve this, we introduce the concept of Software-Free Verification (SFV) -- a standard requiring that voters can independently verify election integrity without relying on any software. We propose a practical, non-cryptographic in-booth voting scheme that achieves SFV for national-scale elections. Our approach leverages a public bulletin board of randomized (Pseudonym, Candidate) pairs, where a mechanically generated pseudonym is hidden among real decoy votes on a physical receipt. Our scheme empowers citizens to audit the election using only basic arithmetic via a hierarchical Public Ledger, while anchoring the overall digital tally to physical evidence and Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) to guarantee systemic integrity. The result is a system that bridges the gap between mathematical security and public transparency, offering a viable blueprint for restoring trust in democratic infrastructure. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_21833 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Publicly Understandable Electronic Voting: A Non-Cryptographic, End-to-End Verifiable Scheme Gat, Alon Cryptography and Security Modern democracies face an existential crisis of waning public trust in election results. While End-to-End Verifiable (E2E-V) voting systems promise mathematically secure elections, their reliance on complex cryptography creates a ``black box'' that forces blind trust in opaque software or external experts, ultimately failing to build genuine public confidence. To solve this, we introduce the concept of Software-Free Verification (SFV) -- a standard requiring that voters can independently verify election integrity without relying on any software. We propose a practical, non-cryptographic in-booth voting scheme that achieves SFV for national-scale elections. Our approach leverages a public bulletin board of randomized (Pseudonym, Candidate) pairs, where a mechanically generated pseudonym is hidden among real decoy votes on a physical receipt. Our scheme empowers citizens to audit the election using only basic arithmetic via a hierarchical Public Ledger, while anchoring the overall digital tally to physical evidence and Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) to guarantee systemic integrity. The result is a system that bridges the gap between mathematical security and public transparency, offering a viable blueprint for restoring trust in democratic infrastructure. |
| title | Publicly Understandable Electronic Voting: A Non-Cryptographic, End-to-End Verifiable Scheme |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.21833 |