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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.22122 |
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| _version_ | 1866914414610874368 |
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| author | Gaidash, Andrei Miroshnichenko, George Kozubov, Anton |
| author_facet | Gaidash, Andrei Miroshnichenko, George Kozubov, Anton |
| contents | In this work we present a comprehensive analysis of a post-selective attack on quantum key distribution protocols employing phase-encoded linearly independent coherent states (or similar alternatives). The attack relies on multimode projection onto a Fock subspace and enables probabilistic extraction of information by an eavesdropper. We derive analytical expressions for the information accessible to the adversary and show that it depends only on three protocol parameters: the mean photon number of the signal states, the phase separation in the information basis, and the expected optical loss of the quantum channel. Several optical realizations of phase-encoded quantum key distribution protocols are analyzed to illustrate the applicability of the results. Possible countermeasures against the proposed attack are also discussed. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_22122 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Post-selective attack with multi-mode projection onto Fock subspace Gaidash, Andrei Miroshnichenko, George Kozubov, Anton Quantum Physics In this work we present a comprehensive analysis of a post-selective attack on quantum key distribution protocols employing phase-encoded linearly independent coherent states (or similar alternatives). The attack relies on multimode projection onto a Fock subspace and enables probabilistic extraction of information by an eavesdropper. We derive analytical expressions for the information accessible to the adversary and show that it depends only on three protocol parameters: the mean photon number of the signal states, the phase separation in the information basis, and the expected optical loss of the quantum channel. Several optical realizations of phase-encoded quantum key distribution protocols are analyzed to illustrate the applicability of the results. Possible countermeasures against the proposed attack are also discussed. |
| title | Post-selective attack with multi-mode projection onto Fock subspace |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.22122 |