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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.23221 |
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| _version_ | 1866914417576247296 |
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| author | Vakarjuk, Jelizaveta Pankova, Alisa |
| author_facet | Vakarjuk, Jelizaveta Pankova, Alisa |
| contents | European Digital Identity (EUDI) Wallet aims to provide end users with a way to get attested credentials from issuers, and present them to different relying parties. An important property mentioned in the regulatory frameworks is the possibility to revoke a previously issued credential. While it is possible to issue a short-lived credential, in some cases it may be inconvenient, and a separate revocation service which allows to revoke a credential at any time may be necessary. In this work, we propose a full end-to-end description of a generic credential revocation system, which technically relies on a single server and secure transmission channels between parties. We prove security of the proposed revocation functionality in the universal composability model, and estimate its efficiency based on a proof-of-concept implementation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_23221 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | PRETTINESS -- Privacy pResErving aTTrIbute maNagEment SyStem Vakarjuk, Jelizaveta Pankova, Alisa Cryptography and Security European Digital Identity (EUDI) Wallet aims to provide end users with a way to get attested credentials from issuers, and present them to different relying parties. An important property mentioned in the regulatory frameworks is the possibility to revoke a previously issued credential. While it is possible to issue a short-lived credential, in some cases it may be inconvenient, and a separate revocation service which allows to revoke a credential at any time may be necessary. In this work, we propose a full end-to-end description of a generic credential revocation system, which technically relies on a single server and secure transmission channels between parties. We prove security of the proposed revocation functionality in the universal composability model, and estimate its efficiency based on a proof-of-concept implementation. |
| title | PRETTINESS -- Privacy pResErving aTTrIbute maNagEment SyStem |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.23221 |