The Distribution of Envy in Matching Markets
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866912980774420480 |
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| author | Ortega, Josué Ziegler, Gabriel Arribillaga, R. Pablo Zhao, Geng |
| author_facet | Ortega, Josué Ziegler, Gabriel Arribillaga, R. Pablo Zhao, Geng |
| contents | We study the distribution of envy in random matching markets under the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using tools from applied probability, we compute the expected number of proposing agents whom nobody envies and those who envy nobody. We obtain an exact finite-market expression for the former, based on a connection with the coupon collector problem, and asymptotic bounds for the latter. To put these quantities into perspective, we compare them to their counterparts under Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD): while RSD assigns a constant fraction of agents to their top choice, both DA and RSD leave exactly $H_n$ proposing agents unenvied in expectation. Our results show that these clearly unimprovable proposing agents constitute a vanishing fraction of the market. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_23385 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Distribution of Envy in Matching Markets Ortega, Josué Ziegler, Gabriel Arribillaga, R. Pablo Zhao, Geng Theoretical Economics We study the distribution of envy in random matching markets under the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using tools from applied probability, we compute the expected number of proposing agents whom nobody envies and those who envy nobody. We obtain an exact finite-market expression for the former, based on a connection with the coupon collector problem, and asymptotic bounds for the latter. To put these quantities into perspective, we compare them to their counterparts under Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD): while RSD assigns a constant fraction of agents to their top choice, both DA and RSD leave exactly $H_n$ proposing agents unenvied in expectation. Our results show that these clearly unimprovable proposing agents constitute a vanishing fraction of the market. |
| title | The Distribution of Envy in Matching Markets |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.23385 |