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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.23574 |
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| _version_ | 1866918407413170176 |
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| author | Liu, Tao Lv, Jiguang Man, Dapeng Xi, Weiye Li, Yaole Zhao, Feiyu Wang, Kuiming Bian, Yingchao Xu, Chen Yang, Wu |
| author_facet | Liu, Tao Lv, Jiguang Man, Dapeng Xi, Weiye Li, Yaole Zhao, Feiyu Wang, Kuiming Bian, Yingchao Xu, Chen Yang, Wu |
| contents | Federated Learning (FL), as a popular distributed learning paradigm, has shown outstanding performance in improving computational efficiency and protecting data privacy, and is widely applied in industrial image classification. However, due to its distributed nature, FL is vulnerable to threats from malicious clients, with poisoning attacks being a common threat. A major limitation of existing poisoning attack methods is their difficulty in bypassing model performance tests and defense mechanisms based on model anomaly detection. This often results in the detection and removal of poisoned models, which undermines their practical utility. To ensure both the performance of industrial image classification and attacks, we propose a targeted poisoning attack, PoiCGAN, based on feature-label collaborative perturbation. Our method modifies the inputs of the discriminator and generator in the Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (CGAN) to influence the training process, generating an ideal poison generator. This generator not only produces specific poisoned samples but also automatically performs label flipping. Experiments across various datasets show that our method achieves an attack success rate 83.97% higher than baseline methods, with a less than 8.87% reduction in the main task's accuracy. Moreover, the poisoned samples and malicious models exhibit high stealthiness. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_23574 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | PoiCGAN: A Targeted Poisoning Based on Feature-Label Joint Perturbation in Federated Learning Liu, Tao Lv, Jiguang Man, Dapeng Xi, Weiye Li, Yaole Zhao, Feiyu Wang, Kuiming Bian, Yingchao Xu, Chen Yang, Wu Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Federated Learning (FL), as a popular distributed learning paradigm, has shown outstanding performance in improving computational efficiency and protecting data privacy, and is widely applied in industrial image classification. However, due to its distributed nature, FL is vulnerable to threats from malicious clients, with poisoning attacks being a common threat. A major limitation of existing poisoning attack methods is their difficulty in bypassing model performance tests and defense mechanisms based on model anomaly detection. This often results in the detection and removal of poisoned models, which undermines their practical utility. To ensure both the performance of industrial image classification and attacks, we propose a targeted poisoning attack, PoiCGAN, based on feature-label collaborative perturbation. Our method modifies the inputs of the discriminator and generator in the Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (CGAN) to influence the training process, generating an ideal poison generator. This generator not only produces specific poisoned samples but also automatically performs label flipping. Experiments across various datasets show that our method achieves an attack success rate 83.97% higher than baseline methods, with a less than 8.87% reduction in the main task's accuracy. Moreover, the poisoned samples and malicious models exhibit high stealthiness. |
| title | PoiCGAN: A Targeted Poisoning Based on Feature-Label Joint Perturbation in Federated Learning |
| topic | Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.23574 |