Software Supply Chain Smells: Lightweight Analysis for Secure Dependency Management

Fuente: arXiv
Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Schmid, Larissa, Gaspar, Diogo, Liu, Raphina, Bobadilla, Sofia, Baudry, Benoit, Monperrus, Martin
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2026
Materias:
Acceso en línea:
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
_version_ 1866914431280087040
author Schmid, Larissa
Gaspar, Diogo
Liu, Raphina
Bobadilla, Sofia
Baudry, Benoit
Monperrus, Martin
author_facet Schmid, Larissa
Gaspar, Diogo
Liu, Raphina
Bobadilla, Sofia
Baudry, Benoit
Monperrus, Martin
contents Modern software systems heavily rely on third-party dependencies, making software supply chain security a critical concern. We introduce the concept of software supply chain smells as structural indicators that signal potential security risks. We design and evaluate Dirty-Waters, a novel tool for detecting such smells in the supply chains of software packages. Through interviews with practitioners, we show that our proposed smells align with real-world concerns and capture signals considered valuable. A quantitative study of popular packages in the Maven and NPM ecosystems reveals that while smells are prevalent in both, they differ significantly across ecosystems, with traceability and signing issues dominating in Maven and most smells being rare in NPM, due to strong registry-level guarantees. Software supply chain smells support developers and organizations in making informed decisions and improving their software supply chain security posture.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_24282
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Software Supply Chain Smells: Lightweight Analysis for Secure Dependency Management
Schmid, Larissa
Gaspar, Diogo
Liu, Raphina
Bobadilla, Sofia
Baudry, Benoit
Monperrus, Martin
Software Engineering
Cryptography and Security
Modern software systems heavily rely on third-party dependencies, making software supply chain security a critical concern. We introduce the concept of software supply chain smells as structural indicators that signal potential security risks. We design and evaluate Dirty-Waters, a novel tool for detecting such smells in the supply chains of software packages. Through interviews with practitioners, we show that our proposed smells align with real-world concerns and capture signals considered valuable. A quantitative study of popular packages in the Maven and NPM ecosystems reveals that while smells are prevalent in both, they differ significantly across ecosystems, with traceability and signing issues dominating in Maven and most smells being rare in NPM, due to strong registry-level guarantees. Software supply chain smells support developers and organizations in making informed decisions and improving their software supply chain security posture.
title Software Supply Chain Smells: Lightweight Analysis for Secure Dependency Management
topic Software Engineering
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.24282