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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.25576 |
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| _version_ | 1866917363163594752 |
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| author | Lee, Jinyoung Tomasin, Stefano Jung, Dong-Hyun |
| author_facet | Lee, Jinyoung Tomasin, Stefano Jung, Dong-Hyun |
| contents | The number of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations has grown rapidly in recent years, bringing a major change to global wireless communications. As LEO satellite links take on a growing role in critical services such as emergency communications, navigation, wide-area data collection, and military operations, keeping these links secure has become an important concern. In particular, verifying the identity of a satellite transmitter is now a basic requirement for protecting the services that rely on satellite access. In this article, we propose an active challenge-response authentication framework in which the verifier checks the satellite at randomly chosen times that are not known in advance, removing the fixed measurement window that existing passive methods expose to adversaries. The proposed framework uses the deterministic yet unpredictably sampled nature of orbital observables to establish a physics based root of trust for satellite identity authentication. This approach transforms satellite authentication from static feature matching into a spatiotemporal consistency verification problem inherently constrained by orbital dynamics, providing robust protection even against trajectory-aware spoofing attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_25576 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Challenge-Response Authentication for LEO Satellite Channels: Exploiting Orbit-Specific Uniqueness Lee, Jinyoung Tomasin, Stefano Jung, Dong-Hyun Signal Processing The number of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations has grown rapidly in recent years, bringing a major change to global wireless communications. As LEO satellite links take on a growing role in critical services such as emergency communications, navigation, wide-area data collection, and military operations, keeping these links secure has become an important concern. In particular, verifying the identity of a satellite transmitter is now a basic requirement for protecting the services that rely on satellite access. In this article, we propose an active challenge-response authentication framework in which the verifier checks the satellite at randomly chosen times that are not known in advance, removing the fixed measurement window that existing passive methods expose to adversaries. The proposed framework uses the deterministic yet unpredictably sampled nature of orbital observables to establish a physics based root of trust for satellite identity authentication. This approach transforms satellite authentication from static feature matching into a spatiotemporal consistency verification problem inherently constrained by orbital dynamics, providing robust protection even against trajectory-aware spoofing attacks. |
| title | Challenge-Response Authentication for LEO Satellite Channels: Exploiting Orbit-Specific Uniqueness |
| topic | Signal Processing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.25576 |