Disguising Topology and Side-Channel Information through Covert Gate- and ML-Enabled IP Camouflaging
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866914425930252288 |
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| author | Fan, Junling Koblah, David Forte, Domenic |
| author_facet | Fan, Junling Koblah, David Forte, Domenic |
| contents | Semiconductor intellectual property (IP) theft incurs hundreds of billions in annual losses, driven by advanced reverse engineering (RE) techniques. Traditional ``cryptic'' IC camouflaging methods typically focus on hiding localized gate functionality but remain vulnerable to system-level structural analysis. This paper explores ``mimetic deception,'' where a functional IP (F) is designed to structurally and visually masquerade as a completely different appearance IP (A). We provide a comprehensive evaluation of three deceptive methodologies: IP Camouflage, Graph Matching, and DNAS-NAND Gate Array, analyzing their resilience against GNN-based node classification, and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Crucially, we demonstrate that mimetic deception achieves a novel anti-side-channel defense: by forcing the mis-classification of cryptographic primitives, the adversary is led to apply an incorrect power model, causing the DPA attack to fail. Our results validate that this multi-layered approach effectively thwarts the entire RE toolchain by poisoning the structural and logical data used for netlist understanding. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_25904 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Disguising Topology and Side-Channel Information through Covert Gate- and ML-Enabled IP Camouflaging Fan, Junling Koblah, David Forte, Domenic Cryptography and Security Semiconductor intellectual property (IP) theft incurs hundreds of billions in annual losses, driven by advanced reverse engineering (RE) techniques. Traditional ``cryptic'' IC camouflaging methods typically focus on hiding localized gate functionality but remain vulnerable to system-level structural analysis. This paper explores ``mimetic deception,'' where a functional IP (F) is designed to structurally and visually masquerade as a completely different appearance IP (A). We provide a comprehensive evaluation of three deceptive methodologies: IP Camouflage, Graph Matching, and DNAS-NAND Gate Array, analyzing their resilience against GNN-based node classification, and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Crucially, we demonstrate that mimetic deception achieves a novel anti-side-channel defense: by forcing the mis-classification of cryptographic primitives, the adversary is led to apply an incorrect power model, causing the DPA attack to fail. Our results validate that this multi-layered approach effectively thwarts the entire RE toolchain by poisoning the structural and logical data used for netlist understanding. |
| title | Disguising Topology and Side-Channel Information through Covert Gate- and ML-Enabled IP Camouflaging |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.25904 |