Centrality-Based Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866908919449780224 |
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| author | Nguyen, Anh Tung Hertzberg, Andreas Teixeira, André MH |
| author_facet | Nguyen, Anh Tung Hertzberg, Andreas Teixeira, André MH |
| contents | This paper addresses the security allocation problem within networked control systems, which consist of multiple interconnected control systems under the influence of two opposing agents: a defender and a malicious adversary. The adversary aims to maximize the worst-case attack impact on system performance while remaining undetected by launching stealthy data injection attacks on one or several interconnected control systems. Conversely, the defender's objective is to allocate security resources to detect and mitigate these worst-case attacks. A novel centrality-based approach is proposed to guide the allocation of security resources to the most connected or influential subsystems within the network. The methodology involves comparing the worst-case attack impact for both the optimal and centrality-based security allocation solutions. The results demonstrate that the centrality measure approach enables significantly faster allocation of security resources with acceptable levels of performance loss compared to the optimal solution, making it suitable for large-scale networks. The proposed method is validated through numerical examples using Erdos-Renyi graphs. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_27581 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Centrality-Based Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems Nguyen, Anh Tung Hertzberg, Andreas Teixeira, André MH Systems and Control This paper addresses the security allocation problem within networked control systems, which consist of multiple interconnected control systems under the influence of two opposing agents: a defender and a malicious adversary. The adversary aims to maximize the worst-case attack impact on system performance while remaining undetected by launching stealthy data injection attacks on one or several interconnected control systems. Conversely, the defender's objective is to allocate security resources to detect and mitigate these worst-case attacks. A novel centrality-based approach is proposed to guide the allocation of security resources to the most connected or influential subsystems within the network. The methodology involves comparing the worst-case attack impact for both the optimal and centrality-based security allocation solutions. The results demonstrate that the centrality measure approach enables significantly faster allocation of security resources with acceptable levels of performance loss compared to the optimal solution, making it suitable for large-scale networks. The proposed method is validated through numerical examples using Erdos-Renyi graphs. |
| title | Centrality-Based Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.27581 |