Gradient Manipulation in Distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent with Strategic Agents: Truthful Incentives with Convergence Guarantees
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866915898388905984 |
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| author | Chen, Ziqin Wang, Yongqiang |
| author_facet | Chen, Ziqin Wang, Yongqiang |
| contents | Distributed learning has gained significant attention due to its advantages in scalability, privacy, and fault tolerance.In this paradigm, multiple agents collaboratively train a global model by exchanging parameters only with their neighbors. However, a key vulnerability of existing distributed learning approaches is their implicit assumption that all agents behave honestly during gradient updates. In real-world scenarios, this assumption often breaks down, as selfish or strategic agents may be incentivized to manipulate gradients for personal gain, ultimately compromising the final learning outcome. In this work, we propose a fully distributed payment mechanism that, for the first time, guarantees both truthful behaviors and accurate convergence in distributed stochastic gradient descent. This represents a significant advancement, as it overcomes two major limitations of existing truthfulness mechanisms for collaborative learning:(1) reliance on a centralized server for payment collection, and (2) sacrificing convergence accuracy to guarantee truthfulness. In addition to characterizing the convergence rate under general convex and strongly convex conditions, we also prove that our approach guarantees the cumulative gain that an agent can obtain through strategic behavior remains finite, even as the number of iterations approaches infinity--a property unattainable by most existing truthfulness mechanisms. Our experimental results on standard machine learning tasks, evaluated on benchmark datasets, confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_27962 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Gradient Manipulation in Distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent with Strategic Agents: Truthful Incentives with Convergence Guarantees Chen, Ziqin Wang, Yongqiang Machine Learning Computer Science and Game Theory Distributed learning has gained significant attention due to its advantages in scalability, privacy, and fault tolerance.In this paradigm, multiple agents collaboratively train a global model by exchanging parameters only with their neighbors. However, a key vulnerability of existing distributed learning approaches is their implicit assumption that all agents behave honestly during gradient updates. In real-world scenarios, this assumption often breaks down, as selfish or strategic agents may be incentivized to manipulate gradients for personal gain, ultimately compromising the final learning outcome. In this work, we propose a fully distributed payment mechanism that, for the first time, guarantees both truthful behaviors and accurate convergence in distributed stochastic gradient descent. This represents a significant advancement, as it overcomes two major limitations of existing truthfulness mechanisms for collaborative learning:(1) reliance on a centralized server for payment collection, and (2) sacrificing convergence accuracy to guarantee truthfulness. In addition to characterizing the convergence rate under general convex and strongly convex conditions, we also prove that our approach guarantees the cumulative gain that an agent can obtain through strategic behavior remains finite, even as the number of iterations approaches infinity--a property unattainable by most existing truthfulness mechanisms. Our experimental results on standard machine learning tasks, evaluated on benchmark datasets, confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach. |
| title | Gradient Manipulation in Distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent with Strategic Agents: Truthful Incentives with Convergence Guarantees |
| topic | Machine Learning Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.27962 |