Evaluating Privilege Usage of Agents with Real-World Tools

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Zhang, Quan, Fu, Lianhang, Lian, Lvsi, Go, Gwihwan, Wang, Yujue, Zhou, Chijin, Jiang, Yu, Pu, Geguang
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2026
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author Zhang, Quan
Fu, Lianhang
Lian, Lvsi
Go, Gwihwan
Wang, Yujue
Zhou, Chijin
Jiang, Yu
Pu, Geguang
author_facet Zhang, Quan
Fu, Lianhang
Lian, Lvsi
Go, Gwihwan
Wang, Yujue
Zhou, Chijin
Jiang, Yu
Pu, Geguang
contents Equipping LLM agents with real-world tools can substantially improve productivity. However, granting agents autonomy over tool use also transfers the associated privileges to both the agent and the underlying LLM. Improper privilege usage may lead to serious consequences, including information leakage and infrastructure damage. While several benchmarks have been built to study agents' security, they often rely on pre-coded tools and restricted interaction patterns. Such crafted environments differ substantially from the real-world, making it hard to assess agents' security capabilities in critical privilege control and usage. Therefore, we propose GrantBox, a security evaluation sandbox for analyzing agent privilege usage. GrantBox automatically integrates real-world tools and allows LLM agents to invoke genuine privileges, enabling the evaluation of privilege usage under prompt injection attacks. Our results indicate that while LLMs exhibit basic security awareness and can block some direct attacks, they remain vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks, resulting in an average attack success rate of 84.80% in carefully crafted scenarios.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_28166
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Evaluating Privilege Usage of Agents with Real-World Tools
Zhang, Quan
Fu, Lianhang
Lian, Lvsi
Go, Gwihwan
Wang, Yujue
Zhou, Chijin
Jiang, Yu
Pu, Geguang
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Equipping LLM agents with real-world tools can substantially improve productivity. However, granting agents autonomy over tool use also transfers the associated privileges to both the agent and the underlying LLM. Improper privilege usage may lead to serious consequences, including information leakage and infrastructure damage. While several benchmarks have been built to study agents' security, they often rely on pre-coded tools and restricted interaction patterns. Such crafted environments differ substantially from the real-world, making it hard to assess agents' security capabilities in critical privilege control and usage. Therefore, we propose GrantBox, a security evaluation sandbox for analyzing agent privilege usage. GrantBox automatically integrates real-world tools and allows LLM agents to invoke genuine privileges, enabling the evaluation of privilege usage under prompt injection attacks. Our results indicate that while LLMs exhibit basic security awareness and can block some direct attacks, they remain vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks, resulting in an average attack success rate of 84.80% in carefully crafted scenarios.
title Evaluating Privilege Usage of Agents with Real-World Tools
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28166