Similarity of Information in Games
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866912988247621632 |
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| author | Basak, Deepal Deb, Joyee Kuvalekar, Aditya |
| author_facet | Basak, Deepal Deb, Joyee Kuvalekar, Aditya |
| contents | Algorithmic content targeting homogenizes information, with implications for strategic interactions. For example, this increased homogenization was arguably responsible for the run on the Silicon Valley Bank. We argue that existing measures of similarity are inappropriate for studying games -- especially coordination games -- because they do not discipline agents' conditional beliefs. We propose a class of stochastic orders, Concentration Along the Diagonal (CAD), built on agents' conditional beliefs. In canonical binary-action coordination games, greater CAD-similarity is both necessary and sufficient for strategic similarity -- agents adopt the same strategy. We further demonstrate CAD's applicability in congestion games, collective action, and second-price auctions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_28190 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Similarity of Information in Games Basak, Deepal Deb, Joyee Kuvalekar, Aditya General Economics Economics Algorithmic content targeting homogenizes information, with implications for strategic interactions. For example, this increased homogenization was arguably responsible for the run on the Silicon Valley Bank. We argue that existing measures of similarity are inappropriate for studying games -- especially coordination games -- because they do not discipline agents' conditional beliefs. We propose a class of stochastic orders, Concentration Along the Diagonal (CAD), built on agents' conditional beliefs. In canonical binary-action coordination games, greater CAD-similarity is both necessary and sufficient for strategic similarity -- agents adopt the same strategy. We further demonstrate CAD's applicability in congestion games, collective action, and second-price auctions. |
| title | Similarity of Information in Games |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28190 |