"What Did It Actually Do?": Understanding Risk Awareness and Traceability for Computer-Use Agents

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Peng, Zifan, Li, Mingchen
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Peng, Zifan
Li, Mingchen
author_facet Peng, Zifan
Li, Mingchen
contents Personalized computer-use agents are rapidly moving from expert communities into mainstream use. Unlike conventional chatbots, these systems can install skills, invoke tools, access private resources, and modify local environments on users' behalf. Yet users often do not know what authority they have delegated, what the agent actually did during task execution, or whether the system has been safely removed afterward. We investigate this gap as a combined problem of risk understanding and post-hoc auditability, using OpenClaw as a motivating case. We first build a multi-source corpus of the OpenClaw ecosystem, including incidents, advisories, malicious-skill reports, news coverage, tutorials, and social-media narratives. We then conduct an interview study to examine how users and practitioners understand skills, autonomy, privilege, persistence, and uninstallation. Our findings suggest that participants often recognized these systems as risky in the abstract, but lacked concrete mental models of what skills can do, what resources agents can access, and what changes may remain after execution or removal. Motivated by these findings, we propose AgentTrace, a traceability framework and prototype interface for visualizing agent actions, touched resources, permission history, provenance, and persistent side effects. A scenario-based evaluation suggests that traceability-oriented interfaces can improve understanding of agent behavior, support anomaly detection, and foster more calibrated trust.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_28551
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle "What Did It Actually Do?": Understanding Risk Awareness and Traceability for Computer-Use Agents
Peng, Zifan
Li, Mingchen
Cryptography and Security
Emerging Technologies
Human-Computer Interaction
Multiagent Systems
Personalized computer-use agents are rapidly moving from expert communities into mainstream use. Unlike conventional chatbots, these systems can install skills, invoke tools, access private resources, and modify local environments on users' behalf. Yet users often do not know what authority they have delegated, what the agent actually did during task execution, or whether the system has been safely removed afterward. We investigate this gap as a combined problem of risk understanding and post-hoc auditability, using OpenClaw as a motivating case. We first build a multi-source corpus of the OpenClaw ecosystem, including incidents, advisories, malicious-skill reports, news coverage, tutorials, and social-media narratives. We then conduct an interview study to examine how users and practitioners understand skills, autonomy, privilege, persistence, and uninstallation. Our findings suggest that participants often recognized these systems as risky in the abstract, but lacked concrete mental models of what skills can do, what resources agents can access, and what changes may remain after execution or removal. Motivated by these findings, we propose AgentTrace, a traceability framework and prototype interface for visualizing agent actions, touched resources, permission history, provenance, and persistent side effects. A scenario-based evaluation suggests that traceability-oriented interfaces can improve understanding of agent behavior, support anomaly detection, and foster more calibrated trust.
title "What Did It Actually Do?": Understanding Risk Awareness and Traceability for Computer-Use Agents
topic Cryptography and Security
Emerging Technologies
Human-Computer Interaction
Multiagent Systems
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28551