A Normative Theory of Decision Making from Multiple Stimuli: The Contextual Diffusion Decision Model

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Shvartsman, Michael, Srivastava, Vaibhav, Sundaram, Narayanan, Cohen, Jonathan D.
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2026
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author Shvartsman, Michael
Srivastava, Vaibhav
Sundaram, Narayanan
Cohen, Jonathan D.
author_facet Shvartsman, Michael
Srivastava, Vaibhav
Sundaram, Narayanan
Cohen, Jonathan D.
contents The dynamics of simple two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) decisions are well-modeled by a class of random walk models (e.g. Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; Usher & McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2006). However, in real-life, even simple decisions involve dynamically changing influence of additional information. In this work, we describe a computational theory of decision making from multiple sources of information, grounded in Bayesian inference and consistent with a simple neural network. This Contextual Diffusion Decision Model (CDDM) is a formal generalization of the Diffusion Decision Model (DDM), a popular existing model of fixed-context decision making (Ratcliff, 1978), and shares with it both a mechanistic and a probabilistic motivation. Just as the DDM is a model for a variety of simple two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) decision making tasks, we demonstrate that the CDDM supports a variety of simple context-dependent tasks of longstanding interest in psychology, including the Flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), AX-CPT (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1996), Stop-Signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984), Cueing (Posner, 1980), and Prospective Memory paradigms (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). Further, we use the CDDM to perform a number of normative rational analyses exploring optimal response and memory allocation policies. Finally, we show how the use of a consistent model across tasks allows us to recover consistent qualitative data patterns in multiple tasks, using the same model parameters.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_28600
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle A Normative Theory of Decision Making from Multiple Stimuli: The Contextual Diffusion Decision Model
Shvartsman, Michael
Srivastava, Vaibhav
Sundaram, Narayanan
Cohen, Jonathan D.
Neurons and Cognition
The dynamics of simple two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) decisions are well-modeled by a class of random walk models (e.g. Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; Usher & McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2006). However, in real-life, even simple decisions involve dynamically changing influence of additional information. In this work, we describe a computational theory of decision making from multiple sources of information, grounded in Bayesian inference and consistent with a simple neural network. This Contextual Diffusion Decision Model (CDDM) is a formal generalization of the Diffusion Decision Model (DDM), a popular existing model of fixed-context decision making (Ratcliff, 1978), and shares with it both a mechanistic and a probabilistic motivation. Just as the DDM is a model for a variety of simple two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) decision making tasks, we demonstrate that the CDDM supports a variety of simple context-dependent tasks of longstanding interest in psychology, including the Flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), AX-CPT (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1996), Stop-Signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984), Cueing (Posner, 1980), and Prospective Memory paradigms (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). Further, we use the CDDM to perform a number of normative rational analyses exploring optimal response and memory allocation policies. Finally, we show how the use of a consistent model across tasks allows us to recover consistent qualitative data patterns in multiple tasks, using the same model parameters.
title A Normative Theory of Decision Making from Multiple Stimuli: The Contextual Diffusion Decision Model
topic Neurons and Cognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28600