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Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Matching Markets

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Babaioff, Moshe, Rubinstein, Aviad, Tan, Xizhi, Wang, Kangning
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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