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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.00188 |
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| _version_ | 1866910091169497088 |
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| author | Qiao, Jingxin Arapinis, Myrto Zacharias, Thomas |
| author_facet | Qiao, Jingxin Arapinis, Myrto Zacharias, Thomas |
| contents | Coercion-resistance (CR) is a crucial security property in e-voting systems. It ensures that an attacker cannot compel a voter to vote in a specific way by using threats or rewards. The Loki e-voting protocol, proposed by Giustolisi \emph{et al.} at IEEE S\&P (2024), introduces a novel design that mitigates last-minute coercion through a re-voting mechanism. It also aims to address the usability issues of the seminal JCJ e-voting protocol, specifically: i) the requirement that voters can store and hide pre-agreed credentials, and ii) the ability of voters to convincingly lie while being coerced.
In this work, we identify two vulnerabilities in Loki. The first is a brute-force attack that compromises the integrity of the evasion strategy. Specifically, this attack allows an adversary to cast a ballot on behalf of their victim in a way that the evasion strategy cannot defend against, rendering it ineffective. The second vulnerability is a forced abstention attack, which allows an adversary to detect when their victim has complied with their instruction not to vote. We generalise the integrity attack to reveal a fundamental dilemma: without pre-agreed secret credentials, it is not possible to prevent last-minute coercion. Finally, we show how reverting to pre-agreed secret credentials fixes the aforementioned vulnerabilities and discuss the trade-off between tallying efficiency and stronger trust assumptions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_00188 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On the Necessity of Pre-agreed Secrets for Thwarting Last-minute Coercion: Vulnerabilities and Lessons From the Loki E-voting Protocol Qiao, Jingxin Arapinis, Myrto Zacharias, Thomas Cryptography and Security Coercion-resistance (CR) is a crucial security property in e-voting systems. It ensures that an attacker cannot compel a voter to vote in a specific way by using threats or rewards. The Loki e-voting protocol, proposed by Giustolisi \emph{et al.} at IEEE S\&P (2024), introduces a novel design that mitigates last-minute coercion through a re-voting mechanism. It also aims to address the usability issues of the seminal JCJ e-voting protocol, specifically: i) the requirement that voters can store and hide pre-agreed credentials, and ii) the ability of voters to convincingly lie while being coerced. In this work, we identify two vulnerabilities in Loki. The first is a brute-force attack that compromises the integrity of the evasion strategy. Specifically, this attack allows an adversary to cast a ballot on behalf of their victim in a way that the evasion strategy cannot defend against, rendering it ineffective. The second vulnerability is a forced abstention attack, which allows an adversary to detect when their victim has complied with their instruction not to vote. We generalise the integrity attack to reveal a fundamental dilemma: without pre-agreed secret credentials, it is not possible to prevent last-minute coercion. Finally, we show how reverting to pre-agreed secret credentials fixes the aforementioned vulnerabilities and discuss the trade-off between tallying efficiency and stronger trust assumptions. |
| title | On the Necessity of Pre-agreed Secrets for Thwarting Last-minute Coercion: Vulnerabilities and Lessons From the Loki E-voting Protocol |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.00188 |