Scalable Coordination with Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibria via Reduced-Rank Structure
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866917379906207744 |
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| author | Im, Jaehan Fridovich-Keil, David Topcu, Ufuk |
| author_facet | Im, Jaehan Fridovich-Keil, David Topcu, Ufuk |
| contents | Chance-constrained correlated equilibrium enables coordination of noncooperative agents under cost uncertainty through probabilistic incentive-compatibility guarantees. However, computing such equilibria becomes intractable in large-scale systems due to the exponential growth of the joint action space. We develop an approximation method for computing chance-constrained correlated equilibria by showing that these equilibria admit a representation as convex combinations of a finite set of chance-constrained pure Nash equilibria, enabling tractable computation without solving the full correlated equilibrium program. Numerical experiments on large-scale multi-airline coordination scenarios demonstrate substantial reductions in computation time while achieving lower system delay costs compared to current operational practice. Under cost uncertainty, the proposed method consistently achieves lower deviation rate compared to the full formulation while achieving comparable coordination performance. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_00456 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Scalable Coordination with Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibria via Reduced-Rank Structure Im, Jaehan Fridovich-Keil, David Topcu, Ufuk Computer Science and Game Theory Chance-constrained correlated equilibrium enables coordination of noncooperative agents under cost uncertainty through probabilistic incentive-compatibility guarantees. However, computing such equilibria becomes intractable in large-scale systems due to the exponential growth of the joint action space. We develop an approximation method for computing chance-constrained correlated equilibria by showing that these equilibria admit a representation as convex combinations of a finite set of chance-constrained pure Nash equilibria, enabling tractable computation without solving the full correlated equilibrium program. Numerical experiments on large-scale multi-airline coordination scenarios demonstrate substantial reductions in computation time while achieving lower system delay costs compared to current operational practice. Under cost uncertainty, the proposed method consistently achieves lower deviation rate compared to the full formulation while achieving comparable coordination performance. |
| title | Scalable Coordination with Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibria via Reduced-Rank Structure |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.00456 |