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Main Authors: Wang, Prince Zizhuang, Jiang, Shuli
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.01487
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author Wang, Prince Zizhuang
Jiang, Shuli
author_facet Wang, Prince Zizhuang
Jiang, Shuli
contents With the rise of personalized, persistent LLM agent frameworks such as OpenClaw, human-centered agentic social networks in which teams of collaborative AI agents serve individual users in a social network across multiple domains are becoming a reality. This setting creates novel privacy challenges: agents must coordinate across domain boundaries, mediate between humans, and interact with other users' agents, all while protecting sensitive personal information. While prior work has evaluated multi-agent coordination and privacy preservation, the dynamics and privacy risks of human-centered agentic social networks remain unexplored. To this end, we introduce AgentSocialBench, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate privacy risk in this setting, comprising scenarios across seven categories spanning dyadic and multi-party interactions, grounded in realistic user profiles with hierarchical sensitivity labels and directed social graphs. Our experiments reveal that privacy in agentic social networks is fundamentally harder than in single-agent settings: (1) cross-domain and cross-user coordination creates persistent leakage pressure even when agents are explicitly instructed to protect information, (2) privacy instructions that teach agents how to abstract sensitive information paradoxically cause them to discuss it more (we call it abstraction paradox). These findings underscore that current LLM agents lack robust mechanisms for privacy preservation in human-centered agentic social networks, and that new approaches beyond prompt engineering are needed to make agent-mediated social coordination safe for real-world deployment.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_01487
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle AgentSocialBench: Evaluating Privacy Risks in Human-Centered Agentic Social Networks
Wang, Prince Zizhuang
Jiang, Shuli
Artificial Intelligence
Social and Information Networks
With the rise of personalized, persistent LLM agent frameworks such as OpenClaw, human-centered agentic social networks in which teams of collaborative AI agents serve individual users in a social network across multiple domains are becoming a reality. This setting creates novel privacy challenges: agents must coordinate across domain boundaries, mediate between humans, and interact with other users' agents, all while protecting sensitive personal information. While prior work has evaluated multi-agent coordination and privacy preservation, the dynamics and privacy risks of human-centered agentic social networks remain unexplored. To this end, we introduce AgentSocialBench, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate privacy risk in this setting, comprising scenarios across seven categories spanning dyadic and multi-party interactions, grounded in realistic user profiles with hierarchical sensitivity labels and directed social graphs. Our experiments reveal that privacy in agentic social networks is fundamentally harder than in single-agent settings: (1) cross-domain and cross-user coordination creates persistent leakage pressure even when agents are explicitly instructed to protect information, (2) privacy instructions that teach agents how to abstract sensitive information paradoxically cause them to discuss it more (we call it abstraction paradox). These findings underscore that current LLM agents lack robust mechanisms for privacy preservation in human-centered agentic social networks, and that new approaches beyond prompt engineering are needed to make agent-mediated social coordination safe for real-world deployment.
title AgentSocialBench: Evaluating Privacy Risks in Human-Centered Agentic Social Networks
topic Artificial Intelligence
Social and Information Networks
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.01487