Security Analysis of Universal Circuits as a Mechanism for Hardware Obfuscation
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866917383734558720 |
|---|---|
| author | Abideen, Zain Ul Garg, Deepali Pileggi, Lawrence Pagliarini, Samuel |
| author_facet | Abideen, Zain Ul Garg, Deepali Pileggi, Lawrence Pagliarini, Samuel |
| contents | Universal Circuits (UCs) offer a promising approach to hardware Intellectual Property (IP) obfuscation, leveraging cryptographic principles to hide both structure and function in a programmable logic fabric. Their adaptability makes them especially suitable for the globalized Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain, where security against threats like reverse engineering is crucial. Despite the potential, UC security remains largely unexplored. This work evaluates UC security against state-of-the-art oracle-guided (OG) and oracle-less (OL) attacks. Results show near-random success rates (approx 50%) for OG attacks whereas OL attacks display minimal structural leakage. Collectively, these findings confirm the feasibility of UCs for IP protection. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_03396 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Security Analysis of Universal Circuits as a Mechanism for Hardware Obfuscation Abideen, Zain Ul Garg, Deepali Pileggi, Lawrence Pagliarini, Samuel Cryptography and Security Universal Circuits (UCs) offer a promising approach to hardware Intellectual Property (IP) obfuscation, leveraging cryptographic principles to hide both structure and function in a programmable logic fabric. Their adaptability makes them especially suitable for the globalized Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain, where security against threats like reverse engineering is crucial. Despite the potential, UC security remains largely unexplored. This work evaluates UC security against state-of-the-art oracle-guided (OG) and oracle-less (OL) attacks. Results show near-random success rates (approx 50%) for OG attacks whereas OL attacks display minimal structural leakage. Collectively, these findings confirm the feasibility of UCs for IP protection. |
| title | Security Analysis of Universal Circuits as a Mechanism for Hardware Obfuscation |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.03396 |