Graduated Trust Gating for IoT Location Verification: Trading Off Detection and Proof Escalation
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866913005562757120 |
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| author | Ootani, Yoshiyuki |
| author_facet | Ootani, Yoshiyuki |
| contents | IoT location services accept client-reported GPS coordinates at face value, yet spoofing is trivial with consumer-grade tools. Existing spoofing detectors output a binary decision, forcing system designers to choose between high false-deny and high false-accept rates. We propose a graduated trust gate that computes a multi-signal integrity score and maps it to three actions: PROCEED, STEP-UP, or DENY, where STEP-UP invokes a stronger verifier such as a zero-knowledge proximity proof. A session-latch mechanism ensures that a single suspicious fix blocks the entire session, preventing post-transition score recovery. Under an idealized step-up oracle on 10,000 synthetic traces, the gate enables strict thresholds (theta_p = 0.9) that a binary gate cannot safely use: at matched false-accept rate (11%), the graduated gate maintains zero false-deny rate versus 0.05% for binary, with 5 microseconds scoring overhead. Real-device traces from an Android smartphone demonstrate the session-latch mechanism and show that a nearby mock location (~550 m) evades theta_p = 0.7 but is routed to step-up at theta_p = 0.9. Signal ablation identifies a minimal two-signal configuration (F1 = 0.84) suitable for resource-constrained scoring layers. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_03896 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Graduated Trust Gating for IoT Location Verification: Trading Off Detection and Proof Escalation Ootani, Yoshiyuki Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture IoT location services accept client-reported GPS coordinates at face value, yet spoofing is trivial with consumer-grade tools. Existing spoofing detectors output a binary decision, forcing system designers to choose between high false-deny and high false-accept rates. We propose a graduated trust gate that computes a multi-signal integrity score and maps it to three actions: PROCEED, STEP-UP, or DENY, where STEP-UP invokes a stronger verifier such as a zero-knowledge proximity proof. A session-latch mechanism ensures that a single suspicious fix blocks the entire session, preventing post-transition score recovery. Under an idealized step-up oracle on 10,000 synthetic traces, the gate enables strict thresholds (theta_p = 0.9) that a binary gate cannot safely use: at matched false-accept rate (11%), the graduated gate maintains zero false-deny rate versus 0.05% for binary, with 5 microseconds scoring overhead. Real-device traces from an Android smartphone demonstrate the session-latch mechanism and show that a nearby mock location (~550 m) evades theta_p = 0.7 but is routed to step-up at theta_p = 0.9. Signal ablation identifies a minimal two-signal configuration (F1 = 0.84) suitable for resource-constrained scoring layers. |
| title | Graduated Trust Gating for IoT Location Verification: Trading Off Detection and Proof Escalation |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.03896 |