Latency-Aware Resource Allocation over Heterogeneous Networks: A Lorentz-Invariant Market Mechanism
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866913005583728640 |
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| author | Alqithami, Saad |
| author_facet | Alqithami, Saad |
| contents | We present a telecom-native auction mechanism for allocating bandwidth and time slots across heterogeneous-delay networks, ranging from low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite constellations to delay-tolerant deep-space relays. The Lorentz-Invariant Auction (LIA) treats bids as spacetime events and reweights reported values based on the \emph{horizon slack}, a causal quantity derived from the earliest-arrival times relative to a public clearing horizon. Unlike other delay-equalization rules, LIA combines a causal-ordering formulation, a uniquely exponential slack correction implied by a semigroup-style invariance axiom, and a critical-value implementation that ensures truthful reported values once slacks are fixed by trusted infrastructure. We analyze the incentive result in the exogenous-slack regime and separately examine bounded slack-estimation error and endogenous-delay limitations. Under fixed feasible slacks, LIA is individually rational and achieves welfare at least \(e^{-λΔ}\) relative to the optimal feasible allocation, where \(Δ\) is the slack spread. We evaluate LIA on STARLINK-200, INTERNET-100, and DSN-30 across 52,500 baseline instances with market sizes \(n\in\{10,20,30,40,50\}\) and conduct additional robustness sweeps. On Starlink and Internet, LIA maintains near-efficiency while eliminating measured timing rents. However, on DSN, welfare is lower in thin markets but improves with depth. We also distinguish winner-determination time from the background cost of maintaining slack estimates and study robustness beyond independent and identically distributed (iid) noise through error-spread bounds and structured (distance-biased and subnetwork-correlated) noise models. These results suggest that causal-consistent mechanism design offers a practical non-buffering alternative to synchronized delay equalization in heterogeneous telecom infrastructures. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_03897 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Latency-Aware Resource Allocation over Heterogeneous Networks: A Lorentz-Invariant Market Mechanism Alqithami, Saad Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Networking and Internet Architecture We present a telecom-native auction mechanism for allocating bandwidth and time slots across heterogeneous-delay networks, ranging from low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite constellations to delay-tolerant deep-space relays. The Lorentz-Invariant Auction (LIA) treats bids as spacetime events and reweights reported values based on the \emph{horizon slack}, a causal quantity derived from the earliest-arrival times relative to a public clearing horizon. Unlike other delay-equalization rules, LIA combines a causal-ordering formulation, a uniquely exponential slack correction implied by a semigroup-style invariance axiom, and a critical-value implementation that ensures truthful reported values once slacks are fixed by trusted infrastructure. We analyze the incentive result in the exogenous-slack regime and separately examine bounded slack-estimation error and endogenous-delay limitations. Under fixed feasible slacks, LIA is individually rational and achieves welfare at least \(e^{-λΔ}\) relative to the optimal feasible allocation, where \(Δ\) is the slack spread. We evaluate LIA on STARLINK-200, INTERNET-100, and DSN-30 across 52,500 baseline instances with market sizes \(n\in\{10,20,30,40,50\}\) and conduct additional robustness sweeps. On Starlink and Internet, LIA maintains near-efficiency while eliminating measured timing rents. However, on DSN, welfare is lower in thin markets but improves with depth. We also distinguish winner-determination time from the background cost of maintaining slack estimates and study robustness beyond independent and identically distributed (iid) noise through error-spread bounds and structured (distance-biased and subnetwork-correlated) noise models. These results suggest that causal-consistent mechanism design offers a practical non-buffering alternative to synchronized delay equalization in heterogeneous telecom infrastructures. |
| title | Latency-Aware Resource Allocation over Heterogeneous Networks: A Lorentz-Invariant Market Mechanism |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.03897 |