Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Wang, Zijun, Tu, Haoqin, Zhang, Letian, Chen, Hardy, Wu, Juncheng, Liu, Xiangyan, Yuan, Zhenlong, Pang, Tianyu, Shieh, Michael Qizhe, Liu, Fengze, Zheng, Zeyu, Yao, Huaxiu, Zhou, Yuyin, Xie, Cihang
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2026
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author Wang, Zijun
Tu, Haoqin
Zhang, Letian
Chen, Hardy
Wu, Juncheng
Liu, Xiangyan
Yuan, Zhenlong
Pang, Tianyu
Shieh, Michael Qizhe
Liu, Fengze
Zheng, Zeyu
Yao, Huaxiu
Zhou, Yuyin
Xie, Cihang
author_facet Wang, Zijun
Tu, Haoqin
Zhang, Letian
Chen, Hardy
Wu, Juncheng
Liu, Xiangyan
Yuan, Zhenlong
Pang, Tianyu
Shieh, Michael Qizhe
Liu, Fengze
Zheng, Zeyu
Yao, Huaxiu
Zhou, Yuyin
Xie, Cihang
contents OpenClaw, the most widely deployed personal AI agent in early 2026, operates with full local system access and integrates with sensitive services such as Gmail, Stripe, and the filesystem. While these broad privileges enable high levels of automation and powerful personalization, they also expose a substantial attack surface that existing sandboxed evaluations fail to capture. To address this gap, we present the first real-world safety evaluation of OpenClaw and introduce the CIK taxonomy, which unifies an agent's persistent state into three dimensions, i.e., Capability, Identity, and Knowledge, for safety analysis. Our evaluations cover 12 attack scenarios on a live OpenClaw instance across four backbone models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4). The results show that poisoning any single CIK dimension increases the average attack success rate from 24.6% to 64-74%, with even the most robust model exhibiting more than a threefold increase over its baseline vulnerability. We further assess three CIK-aligned defense strategies alongside a file-protection mechanism; however, the strongest defense still yields a 63.8% success rate under Capability-targeted attacks, while file protection blocks 97% of malicious injections but also prevents legitimate updates. Taken together, these findings show that the vulnerabilities are inherent to the agent architecture, necessitating more systematic safeguards to secure personal AI agents. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/CIK-Bench.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_04759
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw
Wang, Zijun
Tu, Haoqin
Zhang, Letian
Chen, Hardy
Wu, Juncheng
Liu, Xiangyan
Yuan, Zhenlong
Pang, Tianyu
Shieh, Michael Qizhe
Liu, Fengze
Zheng, Zeyu
Yao, Huaxiu
Zhou, Yuyin
Xie, Cihang
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
OpenClaw, the most widely deployed personal AI agent in early 2026, operates with full local system access and integrates with sensitive services such as Gmail, Stripe, and the filesystem. While these broad privileges enable high levels of automation and powerful personalization, they also expose a substantial attack surface that existing sandboxed evaluations fail to capture. To address this gap, we present the first real-world safety evaluation of OpenClaw and introduce the CIK taxonomy, which unifies an agent's persistent state into three dimensions, i.e., Capability, Identity, and Knowledge, for safety analysis. Our evaluations cover 12 attack scenarios on a live OpenClaw instance across four backbone models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4). The results show that poisoning any single CIK dimension increases the average attack success rate from 24.6% to 64-74%, with even the most robust model exhibiting more than a threefold increase over its baseline vulnerability. We further assess three CIK-aligned defense strategies alongside a file-protection mechanism; however, the strongest defense still yields a 63.8% success rate under Capability-targeted attacks, while file protection blocks 97% of malicious injections but also prevents legitimate updates. Taken together, these findings show that the vulnerabilities are inherent to the agent architecture, necessitating more systematic safeguards to secure personal AI agents. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/CIK-Bench.
title Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04759