Causal Stance
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866917430201155584 |
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| author | Ohmura, Yoshiyuki Kuniyoshi, Yasuo |
| author_facet | Ohmura, Yoshiyuki Kuniyoshi, Yasuo |
| contents | What is the meaning of physical causal closure? Jaegwon Kim explicitly adopts a conception of causation according to which physical causation is effectively identified with deterministic physical lawfulness, and equates it with physical determinism. While this conception is internally coherent, it differs from currently dominant theories of causation. Physics and the theory of causation serve different descriptive purposes. In this study, we refer to them, respectively, as the Physical Stance and the Causal Stance. Within this framework, physical determinism belongs to the Physical Stance, and physical causal closure is defined only within the Causal Stance. Consequently, the two should not be equated. On this basis, this study reconstructs Davidson's anomalous monism as a materialist position that acknowledges mental causation without contradicting physical determinism. Furthermore, we propose a linguistic framework in which physical causal closure does not hold in the Causal Stance while physical determinism remains intact in the Physical Stance. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_05004 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Causal Stance Ohmura, Yoshiyuki Kuniyoshi, Yasuo History and Philosophy of Physics Neurons and Cognition What is the meaning of physical causal closure? Jaegwon Kim explicitly adopts a conception of causation according to which physical causation is effectively identified with deterministic physical lawfulness, and equates it with physical determinism. While this conception is internally coherent, it differs from currently dominant theories of causation. Physics and the theory of causation serve different descriptive purposes. In this study, we refer to them, respectively, as the Physical Stance and the Causal Stance. Within this framework, physical determinism belongs to the Physical Stance, and physical causal closure is defined only within the Causal Stance. Consequently, the two should not be equated. On this basis, this study reconstructs Davidson's anomalous monism as a materialist position that acknowledges mental causation without contradicting physical determinism. Furthermore, we propose a linguistic framework in which physical causal closure does not hold in the Causal Stance while physical determinism remains intact in the Physical Stance. |
| title | Causal Stance |
| topic | History and Philosophy of Physics Neurons and Cognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.05004 |