Time-Domain Voice Identity Morphing (TD-VIM): A Signal-Level Approach to Morphing Attacks on Speaker Verification Systems

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: PN, Aravinda Reddy, Ramachandra, Raghavendra, Rao, K. Sreenivasa, Mitra, Pabitra, Singh, Kunal
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author PN, Aravinda Reddy
Ramachandra, Raghavendra
Rao, K. Sreenivasa
Mitra, Pabitra
Singh, Kunal
author_facet PN, Aravinda Reddy
Ramachandra, Raghavendra
Rao, K. Sreenivasa
Mitra, Pabitra
Singh, Kunal
contents In biometric systems, it is a common practice to associate each sample or template with a specific individual. Nevertheless, recent studies have demonstrated the feasibility of generating "morphed" biometric samples capable of matching multiple identities. These morph attacks have been recognized as potential security risks for biometric systems. However, most research on morph attacks has focused on biometric modalities that operate within the image domain, such as the face, fingerprints, and iris. In this work, we introduce Time-domain Voice Identity Morphing (TD-VIM), a novel approach for voice-based biometric morphing. This method enables the blending of voice characteristics from two distinct identities at the signal level, creating morphed samples that present a high vulnerability for speaker verification systems. Leveraging the Multilingual Audio-Visual Smartphone database, our study created four distinct morphed signals based on morphing factors and evaluated their effectiveness using a comprehensive vulnerability analysis. To assess the security impact of TD-VIM, we benchmarked our approach using the Generalized Morphing Attack Potential (G-MAP) metric, measuring attack success across two deep-learning-based Speaker Verification Systems (SVS) and one commercial system, Verispeak. Our findings indicate that the morphed voice samples achieved a high attack success rate, with G-MAP values reaching 99.40% on iPhone-11 and 99.74% on Samsung S8 in text-dependent scenarios, at a false match rate of 0.1%.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_05683
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Time-Domain Voice Identity Morphing (TD-VIM): A Signal-Level Approach to Morphing Attacks on Speaker Verification Systems
PN, Aravinda Reddy
Ramachandra, Raghavendra
Rao, K. Sreenivasa
Mitra, Pabitra
Singh, Kunal
Sound
In biometric systems, it is a common practice to associate each sample or template with a specific individual. Nevertheless, recent studies have demonstrated the feasibility of generating "morphed" biometric samples capable of matching multiple identities. These morph attacks have been recognized as potential security risks for biometric systems. However, most research on morph attacks has focused on biometric modalities that operate within the image domain, such as the face, fingerprints, and iris. In this work, we introduce Time-domain Voice Identity Morphing (TD-VIM), a novel approach for voice-based biometric morphing. This method enables the blending of voice characteristics from two distinct identities at the signal level, creating morphed samples that present a high vulnerability for speaker verification systems. Leveraging the Multilingual Audio-Visual Smartphone database, our study created four distinct morphed signals based on morphing factors and evaluated their effectiveness using a comprehensive vulnerability analysis. To assess the security impact of TD-VIM, we benchmarked our approach using the Generalized Morphing Attack Potential (G-MAP) metric, measuring attack success across two deep-learning-based Speaker Verification Systems (SVS) and one commercial system, Verispeak. Our findings indicate that the morphed voice samples achieved a high attack success rate, with G-MAP values reaching 99.40% on iPhone-11 and 99.74% on Samsung S8 in text-dependent scenarios, at a false match rate of 0.1%.
title Time-Domain Voice Identity Morphing (TD-VIM): A Signal-Level Approach to Morphing Attacks on Speaker Verification Systems
topic Sound
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.05683