Condorcet-loser dominance among scoring rules
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866917388386041856 |
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| author | Doi, Ryoga Nakamura, Kensei |
| author_facet | Doi, Ryoga Nakamura, Kensei |
| contents | This paper studies a dominance relation among scoring rules with respect to avoiding the selection of the Condorcet loser. In a voting model with three or more alternatives, we say that a scoring rule $f$ Condorcet-loser-dominates (CL-dominates) another scoring rule $g$ if the set of profiles where $f$ selects a Condorcet loser is a proper subset of the set where $g$ does. We show that the Borda rule not only CL-dominates all other scoring rules, but also is the only scoring rule that CL-dominates some scoring rule. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_05916 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Condorcet-loser dominance among scoring rules Doi, Ryoga Nakamura, Kensei Theoretical Economics This paper studies a dominance relation among scoring rules with respect to avoiding the selection of the Condorcet loser. In a voting model with three or more alternatives, we say that a scoring rule $f$ Condorcet-loser-dominates (CL-dominates) another scoring rule $g$ if the set of profiles where $f$ selects a Condorcet loser is a proper subset of the set where $g$ does. We show that the Borda rule not only CL-dominates all other scoring rules, but also is the only scoring rule that CL-dominates some scoring rule. |
| title | Condorcet-loser dominance among scoring rules |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.05916 |