CAAP: Capture-Aware Adversarial Patch Attacks on Palmprint Recognition Models
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2026
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| author | Liu, Renyang Li, Jiale Zhang, Jie Wu, Cong Jia, Xiaojun Li, Shuxin Zhou, Wei Lam, Kwok-Yan Ng, See-kiong |
| author_facet | Liu, Renyang Li, Jiale Zhang, Jie Wu, Cong Jia, Xiaojun Li, Shuxin Zhou, Wei Lam, Kwok-Yan Ng, See-kiong |
| contents | Palmprint recognition is deployed in security-critical applications, including access control and palm-based payment, due to its contactless acquisition and highly discriminative ridge-and-crease textures. However, the robustness of deep palmprint recognition systems against physically realizable attacks remains insufficiently understood. Existing studies are largely confined to the digital setting and do not adequately account for the texture-dominant nature of palmprint recognition or the distortions introduced during physical acquisition. To address this gap, we propose CAAP, a capture-aware adversarial patch framework for palmprint recognition. CAAP learns a universal patch that can be reused across inputs while remaining effective under realistic acquisition variation. To match the structural characteristics of palmprints, the framework adopts a cross-shaped patch topology, which enlarges spatial coverage under a fixed pixel budget and more effectively disrupts long-range texture continuity. CAAP further integrates three modules: ASIT for input-conditioned patch rendering, RaS for stochastic capture-aware simulation, and MS-DIFE for feature-level identity-disruptive guidance. We evaluate CAAP on the Tongji, IITD, and AISEC datasets against generic CNN backbones and palmprint-specific recognition models. Experiments show that CAAP achieves strong untargeted and targeted attack performance with favorable cross-model and cross-dataset transferability. The results further show that, although adversarial training can partially reduce the attack success rate, substantial residual vulnerability remains. These findings indicate that deep palmprint recognition systems remain vulnerable to physically realizable, capture-aware adversarial patch attacks, underscoring the need for more effective defenses in practice. Code available at https://github.com/ryliu68/CAAP. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_06987 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | CAAP: Capture-Aware Adversarial Patch Attacks on Palmprint Recognition Models Liu, Renyang Li, Jiale Zhang, Jie Wu, Cong Jia, Xiaojun Li, Shuxin Zhou, Wei Lam, Kwok-Yan Ng, See-kiong Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security Palmprint recognition is deployed in security-critical applications, including access control and palm-based payment, due to its contactless acquisition and highly discriminative ridge-and-crease textures. However, the robustness of deep palmprint recognition systems against physically realizable attacks remains insufficiently understood. Existing studies are largely confined to the digital setting and do not adequately account for the texture-dominant nature of palmprint recognition or the distortions introduced during physical acquisition. To address this gap, we propose CAAP, a capture-aware adversarial patch framework for palmprint recognition. CAAP learns a universal patch that can be reused across inputs while remaining effective under realistic acquisition variation. To match the structural characteristics of palmprints, the framework adopts a cross-shaped patch topology, which enlarges spatial coverage under a fixed pixel budget and more effectively disrupts long-range texture continuity. CAAP further integrates three modules: ASIT for input-conditioned patch rendering, RaS for stochastic capture-aware simulation, and MS-DIFE for feature-level identity-disruptive guidance. We evaluate CAAP on the Tongji, IITD, and AISEC datasets against generic CNN backbones and palmprint-specific recognition models. Experiments show that CAAP achieves strong untargeted and targeted attack performance with favorable cross-model and cross-dataset transferability. The results further show that, although adversarial training can partially reduce the attack success rate, substantial residual vulnerability remains. These findings indicate that deep palmprint recognition systems remain vulnerable to physically realizable, capture-aware adversarial patch attacks, underscoring the need for more effective defenses in practice. Code available at https://github.com/ryliu68/CAAP. |
| title | CAAP: Capture-Aware Adversarial Patch Attacks on Palmprint Recognition Models |
| topic | Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.06987 |