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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.08482 |
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| _version_ | 1866910117108121600 |
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| author | Aambø, Torgeir |
| author_facet | Aambø, Torgeir |
| contents | Deterrence coalitions that collectively own their deterrence technology, need an institutional design to decide when to retaliate against an attack or incident. This choice of institutional design, formalized through a social choice function, introduces a tradeoff between credible deterrence and escalation risk. We study this tradeoff via a simple signalling model, and use it to construct an associated binary classification problem to determine institutional designs that perform well in a variety of environments. For a small coalition of four members, we compute and study the statistics of the empirical ROC curves associated to a variety of choice functions and probability distributions for retaliation and false positives. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_08482 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Collective deterrence as a classification problem: Voting rules, deterrence credibility, and escalation risk Aambø, Torgeir Optimization and Control Probability 91B14, 91-10, 91A80 Deterrence coalitions that collectively own their deterrence technology, need an institutional design to decide when to retaliate against an attack or incident. This choice of institutional design, formalized through a social choice function, introduces a tradeoff between credible deterrence and escalation risk. We study this tradeoff via a simple signalling model, and use it to construct an associated binary classification problem to determine institutional designs that perform well in a variety of environments. For a small coalition of four members, we compute and study the statistics of the empirical ROC curves associated to a variety of choice functions and probability distributions for retaliation and false positives. |
| title | Collective deterrence as a classification problem: Voting rules, deterrence credibility, and escalation risk |
| topic | Optimization and Control Probability 91B14, 91-10, 91A80 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.08482 |