Reputational Spillovers
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866911580158951424 |
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| author | Kuvalekar, Aditya Sanktjohanser, Anna |
| author_facet | Kuvalekar, Aditya Sanktjohanser, Anna |
| contents | We analyze a reputational bargaining game in which a central player negotiates simultaneously with two peripheral players. Each player is either rational or a commitment type who never concedes and insists on a fixed share, and concessions are publicly observed. The central player's type is global, so actions in one dispute update beliefs in the other and generate reputational spillovers. The game admits a unique equilibrium, enabling a sharp comparison with the bilateral benchmark of Abreu and Gul (2000). Spillovers are payoff-relevant if and only if a peripheral is uniquely the most reputable player initially. In that case, spillovers overturn the bilateral prediction that toughness pays: the central player is never strictly better off and can be strictly worse off; the strongest peripheral loses; and the weakest peripheral can benefit, especially when the center's higher-stakes dispute is with the other peripheral. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_08616 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Reputational Spillovers Kuvalekar, Aditya Sanktjohanser, Anna Theoretical Economics General Economics Economics We analyze a reputational bargaining game in which a central player negotiates simultaneously with two peripheral players. Each player is either rational or a commitment type who never concedes and insists on a fixed share, and concessions are publicly observed. The central player's type is global, so actions in one dispute update beliefs in the other and generate reputational spillovers. The game admits a unique equilibrium, enabling a sharp comparison with the bilateral benchmark of Abreu and Gul (2000). Spillovers are payoff-relevant if and only if a peripheral is uniquely the most reputable player initially. In that case, spillovers overturn the bilateral prediction that toughness pays: the central player is never strictly better off and can be strictly worse off; the strongest peripheral loses; and the weakest peripheral can benefit, especially when the center's higher-stakes dispute is with the other peripheral. |
| title | Reputational Spillovers |
| topic | Theoretical Economics General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.08616 |