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Buying Data of Unknown Quality: Fisher Information Procurement Auctions

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Hu, Yuchen, Wainwright, Martin J., Bates, Stephen
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics Methodology
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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