Modelling the coevolution of opinion dynamics and decision making in social dilemmas
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866915929686802432 |
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| author | Davidson, Ella C. Zino, Lorenzo Cao, Ming Ye, Mengbin |
| author_facet | Davidson, Ella C. Zino, Lorenzo Cao, Ming Ye, Mengbin |
| contents | This paper proposes a mathematical model for the coevolution of actions and opinions for a population facing a social dilemma. In particular, we assume each person participates in a Public Goods Game (PGG), with their action being to cooperate or defect, and holds an opinion about which action they prefer. We propose a payoff function that combines the PGG with the Friedkin--Johnsen model from opinion dynamics to form a coevolutionary game. According to a discrete-time process, players asynchronously update their actions and opinions, aiming to maximise their individual payoff for the coevolutionary game using myopic best-response. We study the equilibria and provide conditions for the existence of the all-defection and all-cooperation consensus equilibria. We also establish conditions for global convergence to the all-defection equilibrium. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_08840 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Modelling the coevolution of opinion dynamics and decision making in social dilemmas Davidson, Ella C. Zino, Lorenzo Cao, Ming Ye, Mengbin Dynamical Systems Social and Information Networks Systems and Control This paper proposes a mathematical model for the coevolution of actions and opinions for a population facing a social dilemma. In particular, we assume each person participates in a Public Goods Game (PGG), with their action being to cooperate or defect, and holds an opinion about which action they prefer. We propose a payoff function that combines the PGG with the Friedkin--Johnsen model from opinion dynamics to form a coevolutionary game. According to a discrete-time process, players asynchronously update their actions and opinions, aiming to maximise their individual payoff for the coevolutionary game using myopic best-response. We study the equilibria and provide conditions for the existence of the all-defection and all-cooperation consensus equilibria. We also establish conditions for global convergence to the all-defection equilibrium. |
| title | Modelling the coevolution of opinion dynamics and decision making in social dilemmas |
| topic | Dynamical Systems Social and Information Networks Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.08840 |