Cover Image

Information Intermediaries in Monopolistic Screening

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Kyriazis, Panagiotis, Lou, Edmund
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Market Composition and the Consumer Surplus-Profit Frontier in Monopoly Screening
by: Kyriazis, Panagiotis
Published: (2026)

Monopolistic Data Dumping
by: Eliaz, Kfir, et al.
Published: (2025)

Regulating a Monopolist without Subsidy
by: Wei, Jiaming, et al.
Published: (2025)

Ignorance Is Bliss: The Screening Effect of (Noisy) Information
by: Feng, Felix Zhiyu, et al.
Published: (2023)

A Dynamic Agent Based Model of the Real Economy with Monopolistic Competition, Perfect Product Differentiation, Heterogeneous Agents, Increasing Returns to Scale and Trade in Disequilibrium
by: Supantha, Subhamon, et al.
Published: (2024)

Screening Frontiers
by: Yang, Frank
Published: (2026)

Coarse Screening
by: Sun, Rui, et al.
Published: (2026)

Screening for breakthroughs
by: Curello, Gregorio, et al.
Published: (2020)

Screening with Persuasion
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2022)

Screening in digital monopolies
by: Dall'Ara, Pietro, et al.
Published: (2026)

Competitive Sequential Screening
by: Ball, Ian, et al.
Published: (2026)

The Screening Cost of Liquidity
by: Sun, Rui
Published: (2026)

Multidimensional Sequential Screening
by: Gao, Eric
Published: (2025)

Screening with damages and ordeals
by: Tokarski, Filip
Published: (2025)

Costly Multidimensional Screening
by: Yang, Frank
Published: (2021)

Screening Workers with Affirmative Action
by: Huang, Charles Po-Cheng
Published: (2026)

Screening for breakthroughs: Omitted proofs
by: Curello, Gregorio, et al.
Published: (2021)

On Regularity and Normalization in Sequential Screening
by: Ball, Ian, et al.
Published: (2024)

Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents
by: Ekmekci, Mehmet, et al.
Published: (2024)

Screening $p$-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait
by: Echenique, Federico, et al.
Published: (2021)

Filling Positions Without Transfers: Screening on Outside Options
by: Honarvar, Morteza, et al.
Published: (2026)

Screening with Advertisements
by: Paramahamsa, Kolagani
Published: (2026)

Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition
by: Galanis, Spyros, et al.
Published: (2024)

Information-Credible Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information
by: Mishra, Kaibalyapati
Published: (2025)

Delegated Information Provision
by: Bilotta, Francesco, et al.
Published: (2026)

Incomplete Information Robustness
by: Morris, Stephen, et al.
Published: (2025)

Coarse Information Design
by: Lyu, Qianjun, et al.
Published: (2023)

Persuasion with Verifiable Information
by: Titova, Maria, et al.
Published: (2025)

Information Sale on Network
by: Do, Jihwan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Withholding Verifiable Information
by: Shishkin, Denis, et al.
Published: (2022)

Robust Information Acquisition Design
by: Gao, Eric, et al.
Published: (2023)

Motivated Reasoning and Information Aggregation
by: Acharya, Avidit, et al.
Published: (2025)

Making Information More Valuable
by: Whitmeyer, Mark
Published: (2022)

Selling Correlated Information Products
by: Hoxha, Klajdi
Published: (2024)

Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
by: Arieli, Itai, et al.
Published: (2025)

The Cost of Optimally Acquired Information
by: Bloedel, Alexander W., et al.
Published: (2025)

Optimal Allocation with Peer Information
by: Niemeyer, Axel, et al.
Published: (2024)

The Design of Monopoly Information Broker
by: Chen, Junjie, et al.
Published: (2025)

Informational Size in School Choice
by: Feng, Di, et al.
Published: (2024)

No Trade Under Verifiable Information
by: Galanis, Spyros
Published: (2025)