On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866908952854265856 |
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| author | Ali, S. Nageeb Liu, Ce |
| author_facet | Ali, S. Nageeb Liu, Ce |
| contents | We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium (Ali and Liu 2026) paths. Moreover, the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths itself is a nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. The set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is therefore the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_09460 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium Ali, S. Nageeb Liu, Ce Theoretical Economics We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium (Ali and Liu 2026) paths. Moreover, the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths itself is a nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. The set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is therefore the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. |
| title | On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.09460 |