How to Use Prices for Efficient Online Matching

Fuente: arXiv
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1. Verfasser: Highsmith, Terence
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Highsmith, Terence
author_facet Highsmith, Terence
contents Many matching markets feature unknown, dynamic arrivals of agents that must match immediately. A caseworker must match an abused child to a foster home, a hospital must assign a patient in critical condition to a room, or a city must place a homeless individual into a shelter. We design an online matching algorithm -- the Sequential Equilibrium Mechanism (SEM) -- that approximates large market equilibria to match arriving agents to objects. SEM is asymptotically efficient, fair, and strategy-proof with probability one. Our application plans to deploy a lab-in-the-field experiment where real caseworkers match vulnerable children to host homes, and we provide simulation evidence that SEM can substantially improve welfare.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_12181
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle How to Use Prices for Efficient Online Matching
Highsmith, Terence
Theoretical Economics
Many matching markets feature unknown, dynamic arrivals of agents that must match immediately. A caseworker must match an abused child to a foster home, a hospital must assign a patient in critical condition to a room, or a city must place a homeless individual into a shelter. We design an online matching algorithm -- the Sequential Equilibrium Mechanism (SEM) -- that approximates large market equilibria to match arriving agents to objects. SEM is asymptotically efficient, fair, and strategy-proof with probability one. Our application plans to deploy a lab-in-the-field experiment where real caseworkers match vulnerable children to host homes, and we provide simulation evidence that SEM can substantially improve welfare.
title How to Use Prices for Efficient Online Matching
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.12181