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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.14070 |
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| _version_ | 1866914476090982400 |
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| author | Rost, Tony |
| author_facet | Rost, Tony |
| contents | Governance opacity over AI systems shifts in kind as capability asymmetry grows, and the strongest forms defeat the disclosure-based remedies governance ordinarily relies on. This paper applies a six-dimension framework from political theory (legitimacy, accountability, corrigibility, non-domination, subsidiarity, institutional resilience) to six AI governance arrangements already in operation, ordered by increasing capability asymmetry between system and overseer. Proprietary secrecy yields to disclosure at the low end, but at the high end the governed system either games its own evaluation or sits inside the governance process, and transparency remedies lose traction. Legitimacy and non-domination strain more consistently across the sample than corrigibility and resilience, which respond more readily to institutional design quality. The sample cannot separate institutional design maturity from capability asymmetry, and the patterns are offered as hypotheses for multi-rater validation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_14070 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | From Disclosure to Self-Referential Opacity: Six Dimensions of Strain in Current AI Governance Rost, Tony Computers and Society Governance opacity over AI systems shifts in kind as capability asymmetry grows, and the strongest forms defeat the disclosure-based remedies governance ordinarily relies on. This paper applies a six-dimension framework from political theory (legitimacy, accountability, corrigibility, non-domination, subsidiarity, institutional resilience) to six AI governance arrangements already in operation, ordered by increasing capability asymmetry between system and overseer. Proprietary secrecy yields to disclosure at the low end, but at the high end the governed system either games its own evaluation or sits inside the governance process, and transparency remedies lose traction. Legitimacy and non-domination strain more consistently across the sample than corrigibility and resilience, which respond more readily to institutional design quality. The sample cannot separate institutional design maturity from capability asymmetry, and the patterns are offered as hypotheses for multi-rater validation. |
| title | From Disclosure to Self-Referential Opacity: Six Dimensions of Strain in Current AI Governance |
| topic | Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.14070 |