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Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Baldwin, Elizabeth, Duetting, Paul, Feldman, Michal, Schlesinger, Maya
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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