HarmfulSkillBench: How Do Harmful Skills Weaponize Your Agents?

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Jiang, Yukun, Zhang, Yage, Backes, Michael, Shen, Xinyue, Zhang, Yang
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Jiang, Yukun
Zhang, Yage
Backes, Michael
Shen, Xinyue
Zhang, Yang
author_facet Jiang, Yukun
Zhang, Yage
Backes, Michael
Shen, Xinyue
Zhang, Yang
contents Large language models (LLMs) have evolved into autonomous agents that rely on open skill ecosystems (e.g., ClawHub and Skills.Rest), hosting numerous publicly reusable skills. Existing security research on these ecosystems mainly focuses on vulnerabilities within skills, such as prompt injection. However, there is a critical gap regarding skills that may be misused for harmful actions (e.g., cyber attacks, fraud and scams, privacy violations, and sexual content generation), namely harmful skills. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of harmful skills in agent ecosystems, covering 98,440 skills across two major registries. Using an LLM-driven scoring system grounded in our harmful skill taxonomy, we find that 4.93% of skills (4,858) are harmful, with ClawHub exhibiting an 8.84% harmful rate compared to 3.49% on Skills.Rest. We then construct HarmfulSkillBench, the first benchmark for evaluating agent safety against harmful skills in realistic agent contexts, comprising 200 harmful skills across 20 categories and four evaluation conditions. By evaluating six LLMs on HarmfulSkillBench, we find that presenting a harmful task through a pre-installed skill substantially lowers refusal rates across all models, with the average harm score rising from 0.27 without the skill to 0.47 with it, and further to 0.76 when the harmful intent is implicit rather than stated as an explicit user request. We responsibly disclose our findings to the affected registries and release our benchmark to support future research (see https://github.com/TrustAIRLab/HarmfulSkillBench).
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_15415
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle HarmfulSkillBench: How Do Harmful Skills Weaponize Your Agents?
Jiang, Yukun
Zhang, Yage
Backes, Michael
Shen, Xinyue
Zhang, Yang
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Large language models (LLMs) have evolved into autonomous agents that rely on open skill ecosystems (e.g., ClawHub and Skills.Rest), hosting numerous publicly reusable skills. Existing security research on these ecosystems mainly focuses on vulnerabilities within skills, such as prompt injection. However, there is a critical gap regarding skills that may be misused for harmful actions (e.g., cyber attacks, fraud and scams, privacy violations, and sexual content generation), namely harmful skills. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of harmful skills in agent ecosystems, covering 98,440 skills across two major registries. Using an LLM-driven scoring system grounded in our harmful skill taxonomy, we find that 4.93% of skills (4,858) are harmful, with ClawHub exhibiting an 8.84% harmful rate compared to 3.49% on Skills.Rest. We then construct HarmfulSkillBench, the first benchmark for evaluating agent safety against harmful skills in realistic agent contexts, comprising 200 harmful skills across 20 categories and four evaluation conditions. By evaluating six LLMs on HarmfulSkillBench, we find that presenting a harmful task through a pre-installed skill substantially lowers refusal rates across all models, with the average harm score rising from 0.27 without the skill to 0.47 with it, and further to 0.76 when the harmful intent is implicit rather than stated as an explicit user request. We responsibly disclose our findings to the affected registries and release our benchmark to support future research (see https://github.com/TrustAIRLab/HarmfulSkillBench).
title HarmfulSkillBench: How Do Harmful Skills Weaponize Your Agents?
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.15415