Reasoning-targeted Jailbreak Attacks on Large Reasoning Models via Semantic Triggers and Psychological Framing

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Wang, Zehao, Wang, Lanjun
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Wang, Zehao
Wang, Lanjun
author_facet Wang, Zehao
Wang, Lanjun
contents Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in generating step-by-step reasoning chains alongside final answers, enabling their deployment in high-stakes domains such as healthcare and education. While prior jailbreak attack studies have focused on the safety of final answers, little attention has been given to the safety of the reasoning process. In this work, we identify a novel problem that injects harmful content into the reasoning steps while preserving unchanged answers. This type of attack presents two key challenges: 1) manipulating the input instructions may inadvertently alter the LRM's final answer, and 2) the diversity of input questions makes it difficult to consistently bypass the LRM's safety alignment mechanisms and embed harmful content into its reasoning process. To address these challenges, we propose the Psychology-based Reasoning-targeted Jailbreak Attack (PRJA) Framework, which integrates a Semantic-based Trigger Selection module and a Psychology-based Instruction Generation module. Specifically, the proposed PRJA automatically selects manipulative reasoning triggers via semantic analysis and leverages psychological theories of obedience to authority and moral disengagement to generate adaptive instructions for enhancing the LRM's compliance with harmful content generation. Extensive experiments on five question-answering datasets demonstrate that PRJA achieves an average attack success rate of 83.6\% against several commercial LRMs, including DeepSeek R1, Qwen2.5-Max, and OpenAI o4-mini.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_15725
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Reasoning-targeted Jailbreak Attacks on Large Reasoning Models via Semantic Triggers and Psychological Framing
Wang, Zehao
Wang, Lanjun
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in generating step-by-step reasoning chains alongside final answers, enabling their deployment in high-stakes domains such as healthcare and education. While prior jailbreak attack studies have focused on the safety of final answers, little attention has been given to the safety of the reasoning process. In this work, we identify a novel problem that injects harmful content into the reasoning steps while preserving unchanged answers. This type of attack presents two key challenges: 1) manipulating the input instructions may inadvertently alter the LRM's final answer, and 2) the diversity of input questions makes it difficult to consistently bypass the LRM's safety alignment mechanisms and embed harmful content into its reasoning process. To address these challenges, we propose the Psychology-based Reasoning-targeted Jailbreak Attack (PRJA) Framework, which integrates a Semantic-based Trigger Selection module and a Psychology-based Instruction Generation module. Specifically, the proposed PRJA automatically selects manipulative reasoning triggers via semantic analysis and leverages psychological theories of obedience to authority and moral disengagement to generate adaptive instructions for enhancing the LRM's compliance with harmful content generation. Extensive experiments on five question-answering datasets demonstrate that PRJA achieves an average attack success rate of 83.6\% against several commercial LRMs, including DeepSeek R1, Qwen2.5-Max, and OpenAI o4-mini.
title Reasoning-targeted Jailbreak Attacks on Large Reasoning Models via Semantic Triggers and Psychological Framing
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.15725