Glitch in the Sky: Exploiting Voltage Fault Injection in UAV Flight Controllers
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| author | Hsiao, Yun-Ping Li, Yanda Gamal, Youssef Bouzidi, Halima Faruque, Mohammad Abudllah Al |
| author_facet | Hsiao, Yun-Ping Li, Yanda Gamal, Youssef Bouzidi, Halima Faruque, Mohammad Abudllah Al |
| contents | As Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) become increasingly pervasive and autonomous, ensuring the resilience of their embedded logic is critical to maintaining safety and integrity. Among the most stealthy and damaging threats are non-invasive fault injection attacks, where hardware-level disturbances propagate into software execution and compromise control logic. In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) autopilot fail-safe mechanisms to voltage glitch fault injection. We introduce a dual evaluation approach: software-based fault simulation using ARMORY and hardware-based experiments with a voltage glitching platform (Chip-Whisperer), applying controlled and timely faults to an STM32 microcontroller running UAV-Autopilot fail-safe logic. Our targeted analysis of specific fail-safe modes uncovers timing-sensitive vulnerabilities that can suppress or alter safety responses, such as disabling emergency failsafe activation at critical moments, potentially enabling UAV hijacking. Furthermore, we validate software-based fault injection results against real hardware behavior, demonstrating how simulated attacks translate into tangible risks for CPS security and reliability. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_16699 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Glitch in the Sky: Exploiting Voltage Fault Injection in UAV Flight Controllers Hsiao, Yun-Ping Li, Yanda Gamal, Youssef Bouzidi, Halima Faruque, Mohammad Abudllah Al Cryptography and Security As Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) become increasingly pervasive and autonomous, ensuring the resilience of their embedded logic is critical to maintaining safety and integrity. Among the most stealthy and damaging threats are non-invasive fault injection attacks, where hardware-level disturbances propagate into software execution and compromise control logic. In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) autopilot fail-safe mechanisms to voltage glitch fault injection. We introduce a dual evaluation approach: software-based fault simulation using ARMORY and hardware-based experiments with a voltage glitching platform (Chip-Whisperer), applying controlled and timely faults to an STM32 microcontroller running UAV-Autopilot fail-safe logic. Our targeted analysis of specific fail-safe modes uncovers timing-sensitive vulnerabilities that can suppress or alter safety responses, such as disabling emergency failsafe activation at critical moments, potentially enabling UAV hijacking. Furthermore, we validate software-based fault injection results against real hardware behavior, demonstrating how simulated attacks translate into tangible risks for CPS security and reliability. |
| title | Glitch in the Sky: Exploiting Voltage Fault Injection in UAV Flight Controllers |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.16699 |