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Autores principales: Shenoy, Keshav, Yang, Li, Sheshadri, Abhay, Mindermann, Sören, Lindsey, Jack, Marks, Sam, Wang, Rowan
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2026
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Acceso en línea:https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.16812
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author Shenoy, Keshav
Yang, Li
Sheshadri, Abhay
Mindermann, Sören
Lindsey, Jack
Marks, Sam
Wang, Rowan
author_facet Shenoy, Keshav
Yang, Li
Sheshadri, Abhay
Mindermann, Sören
Lindsey, Jack
Marks, Sam
Wang, Rowan
contents When model developers or users fine-tune an LLM, this can induce behaviors that are unexpected, deliberately harmful, or hard to detect. It would be far easier to audit LLMs if they could simply describe their behaviors in natural language. Here, we study a scalable approach to rapidly identify learned behaviors of many LLMs derived from a shared base LLM. Given a model $M$, our method works by finetuning models $M_i$ from $M$ with implanted behaviors $b_i$; the $(M_i, b_i)$ pairs serve as labeled training data. We then train an introspection adapter (IA): a single LoRA adapter jointly trained across the finetunes $M_i$ to cause them to verbalize their implanted behaviors. We find that this IA induces self-description of learned behaviors even in finetunes of $M$ that were trained in very different ways from the $M_i$. For example, IAs generalize to AuditBench, achieving state-of-the-art at identifying explicitly hidden concerning behaviors. IAs can also be used to detect encrypted finetuning API attacks. They scale favorably with model size and training data diversity. Overall, our results suggest that IAs are a scalable, effective, and practically useful approach to auditing fine-tuned LLMs.
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spellingShingle Introspection Adapters: Training LLMs to Report Their Learned Behaviors
Shenoy, Keshav
Yang, Li
Sheshadri, Abhay
Mindermann, Sören
Lindsey, Jack
Marks, Sam
Wang, Rowan
Artificial Intelligence
When model developers or users fine-tune an LLM, this can induce behaviors that are unexpected, deliberately harmful, or hard to detect. It would be far easier to audit LLMs if they could simply describe their behaviors in natural language. Here, we study a scalable approach to rapidly identify learned behaviors of many LLMs derived from a shared base LLM. Given a model $M$, our method works by finetuning models $M_i$ from $M$ with implanted behaviors $b_i$; the $(M_i, b_i)$ pairs serve as labeled training data. We then train an introspection adapter (IA): a single LoRA adapter jointly trained across the finetunes $M_i$ to cause them to verbalize their implanted behaviors. We find that this IA induces self-description of learned behaviors even in finetunes of $M$ that were trained in very different ways from the $M_i$. For example, IAs generalize to AuditBench, achieving state-of-the-art at identifying explicitly hidden concerning behaviors. IAs can also be used to detect encrypted finetuning API attacks. They scale favorably with model size and training data diversity. Overall, our results suggest that IAs are a scalable, effective, and practically useful approach to auditing fine-tuned LLMs.
title Introspection Adapters: Training LLMs to Report Their Learned Behaviors
topic Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.16812