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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.16944 |
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| _version_ | 1866913042542886912 |
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| author | Hou, Yuqing |
| author_facet | Hou, Yuqing |
| contents | Although logit quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) offers a natural equilibrium selection mechanism and converges to Nash equilibrium as the rationality parameter tends to infinity, its computation in extensive-form games is generally intractable when based on the normal-form representation, due to the exponential growth of the strategy space. To address this difficulty, this paper develops a sequence-form formulation of logit QRE for finite n-player extensive-form games with perfect recall, which avoids explicit construction of the normal form and enables compact computation. Based on this formulation, we further develop a differentiable path-following method starting from an arbitrary initial point, such that each point on the path corresponds to a logit QRE associated with a particular value of the rationality parameter, and the limiting point yields a Nash equilibrium. In this way, the proposed method provides an efficient computational framework for exploiting the equilibrium selection property of logit QRE in extensive-form games. The effectiveness of the proposed method is validated by theoretical analysis and numerical experiments. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_16944 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Selecting Normal-Form Nash Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games via a Sequence-Form Variant of Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium Hou, Yuqing Computer Science and Game Theory Although logit quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) offers a natural equilibrium selection mechanism and converges to Nash equilibrium as the rationality parameter tends to infinity, its computation in extensive-form games is generally intractable when based on the normal-form representation, due to the exponential growth of the strategy space. To address this difficulty, this paper develops a sequence-form formulation of logit QRE for finite n-player extensive-form games with perfect recall, which avoids explicit construction of the normal form and enables compact computation. Based on this formulation, we further develop a differentiable path-following method starting from an arbitrary initial point, such that each point on the path corresponds to a logit QRE associated with a particular value of the rationality parameter, and the limiting point yields a Nash equilibrium. In this way, the proposed method provides an efficient computational framework for exploiting the equilibrium selection property of logit QRE in extensive-form games. The effectiveness of the proposed method is validated by theoretical analysis and numerical experiments. |
| title | Selecting Normal-Form Nash Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games via a Sequence-Form Variant of Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.16944 |